ISOLATIONISM: ASSUMPTIONS AND EVOLUTION A THESIS IN ... - … - [PDF Document] (2024)

ISOLATIONISM: ASSUMPTIONS AND EVOLUTION

by

JAMES HAROLD MILLER, JR., B.S.

A THESIS

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Accepted

December, 1981

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This writer wishes to express sincere appreciation to the members

of the graduate committee, Dr. S.M. Kennedy, Dr. Ros Simowitz, and

Dr. Richard Vengroff, for their guidance, counsel, and assistance in

the preparation of this thesis. Special consideration and appreciation

is due Patsy Sue Dudley for her time and constructive consideration,

and to Charlotte Barnett for her patience and expert typing skills.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

CHAPTER

I THE HISTORICAL BASES OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM 1

II POST-WORLD WAR I - 1920s 13

III THE ISOLATIONISTS' ASSAULT 25

IV LIMITED WAR 67

V CONCLUSIONS 97

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 107

111

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BASES OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM

Since America's beginning as a nation, a controversy has developed

over the term used to describe American foreign policy in relation to

European affairs. This debate is centered around the term "isolationism"

and the disparate groups that formed in opposition to American involve­

ment in foreign wars. Isolationism, while not an experience peculiar to

America, is vastly different from that form practiced by China and Japan

in the nineteenth century. While China and Japan practiced a total

political, social, and economic isolation from the rest of the world,

America's isolation dealt mainly with political self-sufficiency.

America's brand of isolation was an attempt to avoid involvement in any

European conflict, and they welcomed the social and especially the

economic advantages offered through foreign trade. Seliq Adler in a

discussion of isolationism stated:

We can begin by saying that American isolationism has never meant total social, cultural, and economic self-sufficiency. Such a concept has had few rational advocates and the very idea is nullified by the history of the United States."^

The term "isolationism" and those who advocate its principles have

provided the American political system with an on-again, off-again

Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1933-1941, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 5.

Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, (New York: The Free Press, 1957) p. 30.

debate since this nation's beginning. From President Washington's

Farewell address, Americans have developed a concept which has become

known as isolationism. Throughout this country's history, especially

during periods of extreme international conflict, there have been those

individuals and groups who have advocated returning to earlier times to

escape the pressures and threat of war. After each withdrawal,

when America returned to reality, there have been corresponding pro­

nouncements of the death of isolationism. After 1919 President Wilson

announced that the issue of neutrality could now be laid to rest because

American power made this country a determining factor in the history of

mankind.

Isolationism developed its most powerful and popular form between

the two world wars. Of special interest, are those groups that consti­

tute the isolationists of the 1930s. The material written about this

group is immense, and in addition, the bases of the concept can be re­

duced to only a few major points. These points or values will be used

to attempt to prove that the basic beliefs of isolationism are still

present in the American political system.

The bases of the 1930 isolationism can be reduced to three major

assumptions. The first consisted of the belief in the evils of inter­

national affairs—an isolationist is one opposed to alliances or agree­

ments with any foreign nation that does not involve American territory

or vital interests; the second assumption was that peace-loving nations.

Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds.. The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, (New York and London: 1926-1927) Vol. VI, PP • 18-19.

such as the United States, become involved in war because of a few

selfish, greedy individuals, who manipulate the country for their own

profits; the third assumption—that isolationists were convinced that

since all other countries are amoral, war-like, or vulnerable, it is

necessary for the United States to stand behind a doctrine of unilatera­

lism in its foreign policy.

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to prove that isolationists'

beliefs and concepts are still active in American politics. To do this,

the basic assumptions will be used to demonstrate that those ideas are

still alive, and they seem to appear each time America faces a major

threat of war. The main thrust of this paper is to trace the evolution

of this concept, beginning with Washington's advice to his nation,

through the strongest period of the 1930s up to the present time. The

1930 group will be used to compare and contrast with other individuals

who fit into the isolationist mold. Through public opinion polls,

newspapers, and articles, the general mood of the American people will

demonstrate their support or opposition of world affairs. The Congres­

sional Record will be used to ascertain if a trend in voting pattern

and issues can be determined for individual congressmen on the subject

of foreign affairs. The two major periods of special interest and

study will be the Korean and Vietnam wars.

It is not the intent of this paper to deal with a complete history

of isolationism, as this has been the subject of numerous authors. The

4 Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 100-105-

interest is in determining if the tenets of isolationism emerge during

the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The period covered, from 1930 to

1973, has collected an immense amount of material, too immense in fact

to allow a definitive research of the material. Another factor that

limits this paper is that not all of the research material is available

locally.

Woven into American political thought, from the very beginning of

this nation, was the desire to divorce the new world from the older

countries of Europe. America's Forefathers also expressed their desire

to avoid those old regional and national jealousies that were so preva­

lent in the old world. The American war for independence was an echo

of this thought, and a withdrawal from England meant that the United

States was free from any alliances made with Britain.

Many isolationists point with pride to President Washington's

Farewell Address as the justification for, and the beginning of, the

isolationist spirit. In this appeal Washington warned against "perma­

nent alliances." Adler reported.

In 1776, Washington's Farewell Address was published in the newspapers. This valedictory was destined to be enshrined beside the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as a national classic. The President warned against 'perma­nent alliances,' pointing up the perils of taking sides in Europe's chronic squabbles and invited his countrymen to capitalize upon their 'detached and distant situation.' With characteristic realism, however, he added that 'we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.' Future generations, neglecting to consider his qualifying

Adler, Impulse, p. 16.

Felix Gilbert, To The Farewell Address, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961) appendix, pp. 138-139; Adler, Impulse, p. 16.

phrases, read new meaning into his words, added corollaries to his propositions, and tailored his doctrine to meet their own needs. . . Was Washington speaking only to his contemporaries or to generations yet unborn? No matter how one answers this debatable question, it is safe to say that the Father of our ^ Country made neutrality and non-intervention national fixations.

An illustration of Washington's speech can be traced back to his

actions, or rather his lack of action, during the French Revolution.

Although an alliance had been signed with the French Government,

Washington did little to honor its terms in the interest of preserva­

tion of freedom and democracy. Adler emphasized "that Washington's

decision not to pay too much attention to the literal terms of our

pact with France added something new to the concept of isolation—we g

must be neutral in wars not impinging upon our vital interests."

The clear indication of continuing squabbles and wars in Europe

served to reinforce American Resolve to remain neutral and avoid all

entanglements with the belligerents. There were various reasons for

America to stay out of Europe's problems, but primarily it was because

the United States was in a position of weakness, unable to defend

ourselves against the British and French Navies. Adler underscores

this disadvantage with:

We blundered into the War of 1812 and despite our ocean moats, a British fleet sailed up the Chesapeake Bay to burn the Capitol and the White House . . . . Prior to 1815 it was clearly evident that the security of the United States was at the mercy of events beyond our borders.

In the early 1820s, Russian encroachment in Alaska prompted a

doctrine that would become a cornerstone for the isolationist cause.

President Monroe warned the European nations that they were not welcome

Adler, Impulse, p. 16; Gilbert, Farewell, pp. 138-139.

o

Adler, Impulse, p. 17. 9 Ibid., p. 17.

to expand into the America's, to extend their existing colonies. This

"hands off," message was delivered to Congress on December 2, 1823 and

would later be expanded to include Latin America. The President, in

his declaration, divided the world into two spheres of influence, and

warned that our new world must remain free from old world interference.

The Monroe Doctrine became a rallying point for those opposed to

America's entry into World War I and after the war was used by opponents

of the League of Nations. For the remainder of the nineteenth century

the major thrust of American foreign policy was directed toward expan-

12 sion. Giving comfort and encouragement to those countries desiring

freedom, America was able to do so without any direct involvement.

America was content to give "lip service" without providing direct poli­

tical or military intervention.

The industrial revolution brought about technological changes that

threatened America's geographical isolation from European problems.

These advances, especially in transportation and communication, brought

the nations of the world relatively closer together. This closeness,

a shifting balance of power away from Britain, and the creation of new

rivalries became a threat to world peace. As the twentieth century

approached America, Germany, and Japan became world powers. America

preferred to ignore the war sounds heard across the Atlantic, believing

^%.5. Congress, Senate, Annuls, 18th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Dec, 1823, Vol. 1: 12-24.

"""Ibid., Vol. 1: 12-24; S.M. Kennedy, The Monroe Doctrine Clause of the League of Nations Covenant, (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1979) p. 9.

1 2 Adler, Impulse, p. 23.

that the ocean would insulate and protect this country, and after all,

America had the British Navy standing guard.

At the turn of the century the American mood was self-complacent,

refusing to accept the reality that world peace and security were being

threatened. Twentieth century isolationists believed that by avoiding

any long-term political ties with other nations Americans could best

serve their own national security. Adler makes a similar point:

They (referring to isolationists) opposed our entry into both world wars on the ground that our privileged conti­nental position allowed us to risk the defeat of potential allies. Isolationists have persistently opposed prior commitments of American military aid to any league or as­sociation of nations designed to keep the peace by using force against recalcitrant nations. In other words the iso­lationists have been willing to gamble on the destruction of friendly nations preferring to fight only when confronted by immediate danger.-'--

Prior to the end of the nineteenth century Alfred Thayer Mahan,

through his historical studies on sea power, preached a thesis con­

trary to the basic premise of isolationism, Mahan advocated a strong

and powerful navy in order to protect America's growing commercial

trade, and above all underlined the need for a new foreign policy which

broke away from the idea of isolated America. Mahan believed that any

nation wanting real world power must establish overseas bases in order

14 to maintain command of the seas.

"Expansionism" best describes America's foreign policy at the close

Ibid., p. 32.

"""Voster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1934, (New York: Harper ( Brothers, 1954) pp. 32-33.

8

of the nineteenth century. Men such as Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge,

Theodore Roosevelt, and Josiah Strong urged overseas expansion, each from

differing motives but all were thinking in terms of national honor and

glory. The United States in its spirit of expansionism turned away

from its previous stand of offering only moral support to others in

their struggle for freedom. Actual intervention in Cuba and the result­

ing Spanish-American War, to most Americans, seemed to justify this

country's position as a world power.

Emotionalism fanned by imperialists and a less than conscientious

press appealed to the freedom and liberty-loving instincts of the

American people. Under the guise of "manifest destiny," the United

States flexed its muscles on July 7, 1898, with the annexation of

Hawaii. The peace treaty signed at the end of the Spanish-American

War required that Spain give up her sovereignty over Cuba and cede the

Phillipines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States. These acqui­

sitions and the naval strategy to protect them agreed perfectly with

Mahan's thesis of mercantile imperialism.

There were isolationist voices that appealed to the past and tradi­

tion, recalling the warnings of Washington and Jefferson, but the general

mood of the country supported the imperialists. Opponents of American

expansion engaged imperialists in the Senate over the ratification of

the Spanish peace treaty, but in the end it was approved by a narrow

-^^Ibid., p. 39.

Fred L. Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History: 1648-1967 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967) pp. 851-853.

margin of only two votes. Just as America staked its claim to colonial

possessions, so too did other new colonialist nations, such as Italy,

Germany, and Japan. According to Schapiro, colonial rivalry was an

important cause of the two world wars that devastated the world during

the first half of the twentieth century.

In the presidential election of 1900, expansionism and its policies

formally became a partisan subject. The Republicans accepted the neces­

sity of overseas expansion while the Democratic party opposed any policies

that pushed America toward imperialism. It appears America was prepared

to accept its new role as a world power and the corresponding responsibi­

lities inherent in that role. Such was not the case: in fact, the

United States made no associations or agreements binding them to world

obligations. Americans felt free to follow their own separate course.

Never entirely abandoning its isolationist tradition, America refused to

accept its share of responsibility in the twentieth-century world.

From Porter and Johnson's National Party Platforms; 1840-1956;

Democratic platform; We hold that it is the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world, and, both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to assist the world in securing settled peace and justice . . . and we believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively serve those principles, to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations (1916, p. 196).

Republican platform; We desire peace, the peace of justice and right, and believe in maintaining a strict and honest neutrality

J. Salwyn Schapiro, The World in Crisis, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950) p. 172.

10

between the belligerents in the great war of Europe. We must perform all our duties and insist upon all our rights as neutrals without fear and without favor . . . we believe in the pacific settlement of international disputes, and favor the establishment of a world court for that purpose (1916, p. 204).

This curious dichotomy, America expanding its overseas colonies

while still trying to maintain an isolationist base, is one factor that

distinguishes American isolationism from that of others. Dulles dis­

cusses this same contradiction;

The United States was in fact assuming far-flung responsibilities whose real significane the American people again sought to ignore by denying their existence. Although theory and practice could hardly be reconciled, they appeared to believe that their tradi­tional foreign policy could be upheld by a reassertion of prin­ciples which the new commitments directly violated. Unwilling to go any further than the exercise of a moral influence in world affairs, they blinded themselves to the realities of the ,„ power politics in which the country was now so unavoidably enmeshed.

America's pursuit of imperialism and the resulting necessity to join

in the game of power politics finally found justification in the doctrine

of "manifest destiny." The American people have always believed in their

country, its uniqueness, and its institutions, and to them manifest

destiny implied that American expansion was a natural course—inevitable

and providential. With this doctrine they were able to perceive expan­

sion as a morally-just cause. This same moral attitude carried this

country into the first world war. Stupak, referring to Woodrow Wilson's

ideals, comments;

The moral imperative of United States foreign policy found its

Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party Platforms; 1840-1956, (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1956) pp. 112-116, 121-124, 196, 204; Dulles, America's Rise, p. 58.

19 Dulles, America's Rise, p. 60.

11

strongest expression in Wilsonian internationalism. Wilson's ideals were in fact a projection of American nationality into universal terms. To Wilson American ideals were in perfect harmony with the principles of liberated mankind and were applicable to any society at any time, Americanization of the world appeared to be the ultimate ideal of Wilson's vision. Therefore, even entry into World War I was voiced in strident terms. In Wilson's concern with internal stability of nations along with their international harmony, he adhered to his belief that the foreign and domestic policies of a country could not be separated- Therefore in his mind, peace and democracy were linked as related goals in American foreign policy—and a hint of America's need to intervene in the

^ internal affairs of other nations became a latent tenet of United States foreign policy.20

During this period of power politics, especially Theodore Roose­

velt's administration, the image of the "big stick," the building of

a larger navy, and the concept of America's world role all cast doubt

that isolationism would be capable of survival, but survive it did.

Even though Roosevelt succeeded in increasing the size of the American

Navy, it was not accomplished without stiff opposition. Domestic rather

than foreign interests were the major concerns. The Progressive Move­

ment was in full bloom, leaving the country little time to worry about

the threats in Europe. Dulles emphasizes what most concerned the

Progressives at that time:

The Progressives believed that America was entirely safe in her relative geographic isolation, and that her all-important mission—both to herself and for the world—was to make democracy work at home . . . . In their concern with freedom and justice, they were determined to keep the lamp burning brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations.2'

Internationalists were hard-pressed to convince Americans what

being a world power really meant, and for all practical purposes their

20 Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper

& Row Publishers, 1976) p. 16.

21 Dulles, America's Rise, p. 84.

12

efforts failed. Americans would not believe that collective security

in concert with other nations could possibly maintain their own safety

and democratic principles. Until America's entry into the first world

war, the isolationists' belief had not been put to the test. Most

Americans felt that foreign commitments meant the sure road to war.

The American mind was indeed naive when it was confronted by foreign

affairs, but the great foreign policy debate would begin in earnest

after the war.

CHAPTER II

POST-WORLD WAR I—1920s

President Wilson, after failing to maintain American neutrality

in the First World War, put his faith for collective security into the

formation of the League of Nations. Wilson's vision of world peace

through the concerted efforts of all nations settling their disputes

through the peaceful negotiations of the League was consistent with

his high ideals, and he enumerated these hopes in his famous "four­

teen points." Wilson's support of the League and America's participa­

tion in that organization sparked a foreign policy debate that would

provide a link between the diverse groups known as the 1930 isola­

tionists. With America as a member of the League of Nations, Wilson

hoped to reverse the old tradition of neutrality with the concept of

collective security.

Opposition to American participation in the League stiffened in the

United States Senate over the interpretation of two articles, X and XVI,

of the League's Covenant. Article X which contained a mutual guaranty:

. . . against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.2

"'"Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp. 1-2.

^Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, p. 1278, U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 July 1919, 58:2342; Hamilton Foley, Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations, (Port Washington, New York; Kennikat Press, Inc., 1923) Appendix F, p. 256.

13

14

Article XVI was opposed by Congress because it detailed and bound members

to the economic, diplomatic, and military actions against any nation

breaking the Covenant, thereby disrupting American unilateralism.

When Wilson submitted the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate on

July 10, 1919, that body was split into approximately four groups:

One group was in favor of the Treaty without reservation, and composed of one Republican and forty-three Democrats. A second group, the mild reservationists, had some reservations but generally were in favor of the Treaty. The third group also favored ratification, but had extensive reservations. Finally the fourth group, known as the 'irreconcilables,' consisting of twelve Republicans and three Democrats who were opposed to ratification of the Treaty under any conditions,'^

This latter group, led by Senator William E. Borah of Idaho

objected to the idea that Article X would do anything but mean American

involvement in one European war after another. The matter of the

United States joining the League became a partisan affair, with the

Republican party predominantly favoring neutrality and the Democrats

mainly in favor of internationalism. While difficult to prove such

blanket statements, the record does support the generalization that

isolationism between the two world wars was partisan in nature. The

reservationists were primarily concerned with Article X of the Covenant,

and its strict commitment to the collective measures of the Council

rather than allowing Americans freedom of independent action. They

argued that Congress be allowed to decide America's course rather than

^Ibid., p. 1278; 58:2342; pp. 261-262.

^Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1944) p. 7.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th

Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1919, 58:3094-3095, 3143, 3145, 3148; Divine, T 1 1 I ic3i o n n 9

15

be bound to the collective decisions of the League.

Reservationists were quick to recall Washington and Jefferson's

words warning against entanglements and alliances with foreign nations,

and expressed the fear that the League might pose a threat to the

Monroe Doctrine. Other groups in America were, in the meantime, busy

searching for other alternatives in their quest for world peace. Some

pacifist groups, anxious for some form of collective security, turned

toward disarmament as an answer. Although some efforts were made to

limit the export of arms, they were unsuccessful, and in the 1920s a

third approach was tried—to have war declared illegal under international

law. Eventually the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed on August 27, 1928, Q

that outlawed war as an alternative to national policy.

In 1921, President Harding extended invitations for a conference

on the limitation of armaments to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan,

China, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. The agenda for the Washington

Naval Conference encompassed navy limitations, new weapons, land

armament, and Far Eastern questions. The Conference was greeted warmly

by those opposed to the League, to pacifists looking for alternatives, 9

and even to those who favored joining the League.,

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 July 1919, 58:3144, 3146-3147; Johnson, The Battle, p. 11. For party platform see pp. 9-10 above.

C.J. Bartlett, The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana, (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1974) pp. 44-45; U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1919, 58:3143-3145, 3148.

o

Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, p. 2395, Article I; Divine, Illusion, pp. 6-9.

9 Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, pp. 2277-2299; Bartlett,

Pax Americana, p. 50; Adler, Impulse, pp. 133-139.

16

Harding faced a difficult problem with the Naval appropriations

bill before Congress at this same time. He thought that it would be

next to impossible to obtain an increase in budget appropriations neces­

sary to strengthen America's Navy and its bases. The other nations were

ready for the talks because of budget considerations, and Japan also

welcomed the thought that limitations might mean less Western influence

in Asia. The treaties resulting from that conference—seven treaties

and twelve resolutions—were completed in February, 1922. America won

parity with Britain and a five-to-three superiority over Japan in the

naval limitations of capital ships. Realistically, Japan won dominance

of the Far East even though the British were allowed to develop Singa­

pore as a base for its eastern empire. The Washington Treaties were a

step in the right direction, as far as the isolationists were concerned,

but only a beginning. As Bartlett emphasizes:

Critics have made much of the absence of 'teeth' in the Four Power Non-Aggression Treaty that replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This provided only for consultation between the signatories, the United States, Britain, Japan, and France, in the event of a crisis. But in the Senate debates on the treaties, no clause received so much support as that ensuring that the United States would be entering no commitments of any kind . . . . The Washington Treaties were, of course, no more than a start in arms limitations and in the creation of stabi­lity in the Far East,-'-

Some of the soon-to-be staunch isolationists were in a conversion

period during the 1920s, One of these men was historian Charles Beard,

who had become disillusioned by the lack of ideal results after the First

World War, Another was Senator Gerald P. Nye, who became convinced

Israel, ed,. Major Peace Treaties, pp, 2279-2280, Article IV Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 51; Adler, Impulse, pp. 133-139.

17

that his constituents' problems in North Dakota were the result of

greedy businessmen and bankers. Those who were still not convinced

of this thesis would only have to wait until the Wall Street Crash of

1929 for their final conversion; the financial collapse caused

World War I creditors to repudiate their debts.

In late 1927, Representative Theodore E, Burton introduced a re­

solution in the House to embargo the export of arms to aggressor na­

tions. The resolution called for a radical change in American foreign

policy, which had before, based American neutrality upon the impartial

12 and equal treatment of all belligerents. On February 11, 1929,

Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas introduced an embargo resulution which

gave the president power to embargo the export of arms or other articles

of war to the aggressor nation and refused protection to American

citizens who violated the Kellogg Pact.

The largest stumbling blocks to these resolutions were American

hostility to collective security and the deep distrust of the League of

Nations. Most newspapers were less than enthusiastic and were quick to

point out that the Capper plan, especially, would hand over too great a

power to the President in deciding when a nation had violated the

antiwar treaty.

This controversy over neutrality, begun with the Burton and Capper

Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 54,

U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 Dec. 1927 57:2045, Part 2; Divine, Illusion, pp. 7-13.

1 3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd

Sess., 11 Feb. 1929, 67:3198, Part 3.

^^New York Times, 12 Feb. 1929, p. 21, "To Keep Guns from Warring Nations."

18

resolutions, brought about little in the way of immediate results. The

fear of war could and did take many forms, including the implied threat

to American democracy. The disputes were mainly academic, having little

effect upon the conduction of American foreign policy, for the majority

of the American people remained opposed to involvement in any European

wars.

Before turning to the activities of the 1930 isolationists, the

leaders of the movement and some of the more active organizations

should be identified. Any study of isolationist organizations between

the two world wars, reveals the existence of a wide divergence of poli­

cies and goals that these groups advocated. They did not completely

agree upon any associated effort to ensure that America remained neutral.

As a matter of fact, there was never any serious effort toward unity of

voice until 1940 with the foundation of the America First Committee,

and even those efforts were unsuccessful. Because there were numerous

organizations, not all will be mentioned, but it is necessary to list

the major groups and those individuals in leadership roles.

It is difficult to place everyone into one specific category, not

only because of their differences in ideology, but also because some

were constantly shifting their positions. Manfred Jonas has suggested

a reasonable grouping of five categories that most isolationists will

fit into;

The first category consists of those most easily distinguished from the others, foreign-oriented isolationists, they were those individuals who were sympathetic to the Axis Powers or the Soviet Union; the second group, the belligerent isolationists, believed in a vigorous defense of American rights, reliance upon international law, and strict adherence to the unilateral policy of the nineteenth century; thirdly the timid isolationists were

19

those prepared to surrender some traditional rights in order to minimize direct contact with foreign nations at war and thus avoid entanglements; the fourth group, radical isolationists, sought to keep out of the war at all costs in order to facilitate the establishment of a new social order in America; and finally, the conservative isolationists, those who saw war as the final blow to the old order whose institutions and traditions they were desperately attempting to save. All of these groups, except for the foreign-oriented, shared the assumptions that provide the bases for American isolationism before World War 11.^^

These divisions, while not providing a sharp distinction between each

other, do serve to demonstrate some of the major differences between

isolationists. Many isolationists varied their positions and might be

included in several groups. Others, who at one time or another were

spokesmen for the isolationists, later came to support FDR's foreign

policy.

Foreign-oriented individuals were very interested and active in the

isolationists' movement throughout the 193Qs. One of those acting in

the interest of Germany, his home of birth, was the poet-propagandist

George Sylvester Viereck. During the thirties Viereck was employed by

the German Consul in New York. During the same period Ralph Townsend,

a former member of the United States Consular Service in China, was the

public relations agent for the Japanese Government. Townsend was allied

with the isolationist movement, and in 1941 he was an editor for the

isolationist Scribners Commentary.

Father Charles E. Coughlin of the Shrine of the Little Flower in

Royal Oak, Michigan, began with his own self-designed brand of Christian

socialism. An early supporter of FDR's New Deal, he abandoned the

Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 34-35.

Ibid., pp. 35-37.

20

capitalist bandwagon to form a political pressure group in 1934, the

National Union for Social Justice, Coughlin was in the isolationist

camp, but his motivation for American neutrality was a desire that

America do nothing to prevent the Axis Powers from winning the war.

From 1929 to 1939, the American Communist Party was at odds with

isolationists, charging that they were all fascists. The party

favored aid to the Spanish and Chinese Governments. When Germany and

Russia signed a nonaggression pact on August 22, 1939, the party im­

mediately became opponents of American involvement in the war. This

commitment to isolationism lasted only until Germany invaded Russia on

June 22, 1941. Communist and pro-fascist organizations were on the

extreme edge of isolationism, but they did have the issue of neutrality

as a common base with the movement. After the neutrality issue, their

interests and ideas divide.

The major contributors to the isolationist movement, however, were

not foreign-oriented. If anything they were nationalists, concerned

with keeping America free and on an independent course. There were

three major leaders in Congress during the thirties who belong in the

category of belligerent isolationists. Two of these were Senators

William E. Borah of Idaho and Hiram W. Johnson of California. Both men

were nearly seventy and each had served in the Senate for many years.

Although they nearly always arrived at the same conclusion in relation

to isolationism, their foreign policy approach differed. Johnson thought

of America exclusively, completely disliking and distrusting foreign

• • Ibid., pp. 37-42.

21

nations and their citizens, Borah was the opposite, with an interest

and preference for foreign policy he sought membership on the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, Borah believed in America as did Johnson,

but Borah welcomed intercourse with other nations as the means to

advance United States interests. Both men advocated neutrality legis­

lation, but not if it meant protection for the interests of Britain and

France,

The third leader of the belligerents was Representative Hamilton

Fish; born in 1888 he represented another generation from Borah and

Johnson. Unlike the other two men. Fish counted George Viereck among

his friends, and even went so far as to allow the use of his franking

privileges for the mailing of Nazi speeches and pamphlets. Fish did not

believe in giving up American rights or curtail trade in order to avoid

involvement in world affairs. Other belligerent isolationists include

Representatives Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts and John M, Robsion

of Kentucky. The major basis for the belligerents was the firm belief

in international law supplied by two authorities in the field, John

Bassett Moore and Edwin M. Borchard, The seventy-five-year-old Moore

and his former student, Borchard, had distinguished teaching careers at

Columbia and Yale, and practical experience in international affairs.

Moore's public statements were frequently quoted and read into the Con­

gressional Record to support the arguments of Borah, Johnson, and Fish,

For more information on these men see Jonas, who devotes two chapters to a brief, but good biography of the leaders in the isola­tionist movement. Isolationism in America, pp. 32-99.

22

They stressed that the United States must remain neutral in spirit and

19 depend upon international law to defend its rights.

Opposed to dependence on international law to preserve American

rights from the dangers of war was the third group, timid isolationists.

In 1935 the National Council for the Prevention of War argued that the

attempt to preserve neutral rights was the cause of American entry into

three wars. Working on the same assumption was Republican Senator

Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, who subsequently introduced legislation

that would have forfeited traditional neutral rights. Democrats

Maury Maverick of Texas and Frank L. Kloeb of Ohio made similar proposals

in the House. Nye gained prominence through his committee investigations

of the munitions industry. Nye's conversion and belief in isolationism

stems from his mistrust of business and banking interests. Maverick and

some of his other colleagues were generally motivated by their horror of

20 war and its detrimental effect upon domestic reform.

Some of the other active members of this group were Senators Homer

T. Bone of Washington, Bennett C. Clark of Missouri, and Arthur H.

Vanderberg of Michigan; and also Representatives Jerry Voorhis of Califor­

nia, John A. Martin of Colorado, John Luecke of Michigan, Herbert S.

Bigelow of Ohio, Fred H. Hildebrandt of South Dakota, John Coffee and

Knute Hill of Washington, and George J. Schneider of Wisconsin. Outside

of Congress, additional support for timid isolationism came from Donald

19 Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 42-52.

Ibid., pp. 57-63.

23

W. Stewart, past commander of the Kansas Department of the American

Legion; the Jesuit periodical America, who felt that the best way to stay

out of war, was to stay out of the profits of war.

The fourth category, the radical isolationists, were composed of

liberals and radicals who believed that the New Deal offered the chance

for a much-needed domestic reform, and feared that the reform might be

damaged or delayed if America became involved in a war. One notable

proponent of this position, Charles A. Beard, added an academic and

intellectual component to isolationism. Beard advocated that the pur­

pose of this country was to design a continental policy toward establish­

ing a democratic cooperative commonwealth. Other intellectual supporters

were Phillips Bradley of Amherst, Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith, Robert

22 M. Hutchins of Chicago, and Henry Noble MacCracken of Vassar.

Norman Thomas, a prolific writer and a dynamic speaker, whose appeal

transcended the socialist party was a convinced pacifist. Thomas became

the chief spokesman for the isolationists of the left. Others holding

radical isolationist views were Alfred M. Bingham, editor of Common

Sense; Jerome Frank, once a New Deal lawyer who later became a judge of

the United States Court of Appeals; Bertram D. Wolfe who co-authored a

book with Thomas, Keep America Out of War; labor economist Stuart

23 Chase; and Oswald Garrison Villard, active in numerous minority causes.

The final group, the conservative isolationists, feared that Ameri­

can involvement in foreign affairs would eventually lead to the elimination

• Ibid., pp. 64-69.

Ibid., pp. 71-77.

^^Ibid., OD. 77-87.

24

of the free enterprise system in the United States. They worried that

the President's interest in Asia and Europe, and his preoccupation with

domestic reform would lead, in the end, toward a dictatorship. President

Roosevelt's requests for more power and discretion led them to believe

that the President was leading the nation toward the creation of a

socialist dictatorship, which would be impossible to dispose of after

the war. Senators Robert A. Taft and Herbert Hoover were key figures

in this group, and both were convinced of the possibility of a dictator-

u- 24 ship-

The Saturday Evening Post produced a series of editorials, appearing

in 1939, claiming that after 1937, a relationship existed between the

failure of the New Deal and a corresponding shift in Roosevelt's foreign

policy. Others who advocated the conservative theory were William J,

Goodwin, leader of New York's Queens County; Amos Pinchot, an anti-

New Deal progressive, and later a member of the national committee of

America First; Robert E, Wood, chairman of the board of Sears; and

25 Colonel Charles A Lindbergh, aviator and American hero.

This is a brief listing of some of the more prominent Americans

involved in the isolationist movement of the thirties. It is not meant

to be a definitive list of all isolationists and their goals, but only

a brief description. It may be more apparent now why these groups were

unable to arrive at a consensus of opinion.

^^Ibid., pp, 87-90,

25 Ibid,, pp, 91-99; For a more detailed discussion of the America

First organization see: Wayne S, Cole, America First, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953).

CHAPTER III

THE ISOLATIONISTS' ASSAULT

President Hoover, already involved in the domestic crisis of the

stock market collapse, next was confronted with the Manchurian situation.

Hoover immediately made the decision to concentrate all his energies

upon the financial collapse and attempt to avoid any American involvement

in the foreign war. The League of Nations, facing its first major

international crisis, was slow to act. The League Council, after consi­

deration, decided against the use of sanctions and ended by creating the

Lytton Commission to investigate the Japanese aggression.

The isolationists' assault against the interventionists was waged

in the 1930s to prevent American entry into another disastrous war. The

individuals and groups associated with the isolationist cause, advocated

certain basic assumptions. These beliefs consisted of avoidance of

alliances with foreign nations without a clear-cut example that the

agreement involved American interests or territory. Secondly, isola­

tionists believed that a conspiracy existed among a small elite group,

whose profits were dependent upon war, and that they were responsible

for involving the United States in war. Finally, the third tenet,

isolationists demanded that America retain the freedom of choice in its

foreign policy, that is, a unilateral course completely independent of

Divine, Illusion, pp. 24-25.

25

26

other nations. Of course there were other assumptions of these 1930

isolationists, but these are the three basic beliefs used to determine

if they are present in the political system of the 1950s and 60s.

In the interim Japan was in the process of occupying all of

Manchuria. Hoover preferred to use non-recognition of Japan's conquest

as a protest, refusing to cooperate with the League in any way. Hoover's

Secretary of State Stimson believed, and suggested to his boss that the

United States should cooperate with the League in taking economic

sanctions against Japan. Some members of Congress were in agreement

with Stimson that non-recognition of Japanese aggression was too mild

under the circ*mstances. In December, 1931, Representative Morton Hull

of Illinois introduced a resolution calling for an embargo of all trade

2 against any nation violating the Kelogg-Briand Pact.

After Stimson advised Hull that it would be an inopportune time for

a congressional debate on such a delicate subject, the Congressman

withdrew his resolution. In April of the next year Senator Capper intro­

duced another resolution to embargo arms, quickly followed by one by

Senator Clarence C. Dill which would embargo arms going to both China

and Japan. Representative Hamilton Fish presented his resolution in

the House to embargo arms to all belligerents in time of war. All but

the Fish resolution were rejected in their respective chambers. Public

hearings were scheduled for February 7, and Fish had gained the support

2 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess.,

13 Feb. 1932, 75:3891,

U,S, Congress, Senate, House, Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 6 Apr. 1932, 75:660, 7529.

27

of Dorothy Detzer, lobbyist for the Women's International League for

Peace and Freedom, who brought thirty-two witnesses to testify in favor

of the resolution.

Because of the large crowds attracted to the hearings, the State

Department asked the committee to cancel, fearing that open debate on

the subject might offend the Japanese. Regardless of the cancellation.

Fish was determined to have the embargo issue debated openly and sug­

gested that the American representatives, presently attending the Geneva

General Disarmament Conference, propose a multilateral treaty banning

the export of arms and munitions to any foreign country. Fish believed

that the shipment of munitions was the first step toward war and that

an arms embargo was absolutely essential if America was to remain

neutral.

In the public hearings eventually held in March, the witnesses

labelled the arms manufacturers as those most responsible for wars, and

the committee reported favorably on the resolution. Secretary Simpson

was placed in the most difficult position of opposing all embargo

proposals introduced into Congress. Stimson's action was necessary in

light of Hoover's adamant stand of avoiding any alignment with the League

in its restrainment of Japan. Consequently, the arms embargo proposals

failed to win sufficient support to pass Congress, Although those who

Divine, Illusion, p, 28,

Ibid,, p, 28.

U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 1st Sess., 6 Apr. 1932, 75:3561.

' Ibid., 75:3561-3562.

28

favored isolation still opposed American involvement in the League and

the World Court, Japanese aggression gave the 1930 isolationists another

rallying point.

In the 1930s isolationists took the offensive: instead of the

watchword "keep out of the League," the cry became "keep out of the Q

war," Adler believes that two factors brought about this glorified

isolationism:

The impact of the great depression—perhaps no single result of the depression bred more isolationists than the repudia­tion of the war debts; and the second factor precipitating the new dynamic isolationism was the wave of aggressions that undermined and then destroyed the Versailles Peace Settlements.

Meanwhile Stimson worked diligently to change American foreign

policy toward world peace, asking Hoover to support an amendment to

the 1922 Embargo Act which would give the President authority to embargo

arms to any nation where war was threatened or actually existed. How­

ever, the information was leaked to the press, and the administration

was besieged by arms manufacturers protesting their loss of business if

the proposal was passed. After so much pressure Hoover refused to sup­

port the proposal, without some revision. On January 10, 1933, Hoover

urged ratification and recommended that the arms embargo be limited to

control, only if all other arms-producing nations acted together in the

embargo.

Final passage of the resolution, formally sponsored by Senator

g

Adler, Impulse, p. 224.

^Ibid., pp. 224-246.

Divine, Illusion, pp. 33-41.

29

Borah, seemed almost assured after he gained unanimous consent for its

transition without debate. However, Senotor Hiram Bingham of Connecti­

cut who was absent during the first vote, asked for reconsideration of

the resolution. Under the rules of the Senate, Bingham's request pre­

vented adoption of the measure without a full debate. The major opponents

of the arms embargo appeared to be the arms manufacturers expressed

through their lobbying of the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments. Most

of the major peace organizations in America publicly expressed their

approval of such legislation. While the majority of the Senate were in

favor of the resolution, Bingham threatened a filibuster which would

interfere with important domestic legislation, and he eventually gained

enough support to block Borah from bringing up his embargo resolution.

The State Department then decided to move the proposed embargo to

the House, enlisting Representative Sam D. McReynolds of Tennessee as its

sponsor. Representatives Maas and Fish charged that if the resolution

passed, that the administration would have America at war with Japan in

a very short time. Further Japanese aggression in China completely

convinced Fish that the embargo would be used specifically against Japan.

Isolationists in the House led by Fish, along'with help from the munitions

12 industry, managed to prevent passage of the embargo in the House.

In 1933, the League accepted the Lytton Commission's report which

condemned Japanese aggression Manchuria. Japan promptly rejected their

findings and withdrew from the League Covenant. In the same manner that

"'"•'"U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2nd Sess., 11 Jan. 1933, 76:1551; 19 Jan. 1933, 76:2096; 20 Jan, 1933, 76:2134-2135.

^^Ibid., 30 Jan. 1933, 76:2943.

30

the depression aided the Japanese radicals to overcome their more

moderate opponents. Hitler and his Nazi supporters were taking advantage

of Germany's economic problems to gain power. On January 30, 1933,

President Paul Von Hindenburg was forced to invite Hitler to become

Chancellor of a coalition cabinet. At the same time Italy's Mussolini

was carefully watching and waiting for the first opportunity for

expansion.

In America Hoover was facing the 1932 elections with its strong

favor of internationalism. A near dead-lock at the Democratic convention

between Roosevelt and Alfred E. Smith was broken when William Randolph

Hearst promised the California delegates to FDR. Hearst had been con­

cerned with FDR's previous support of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism

and demanded a public repudiation. Roosevelt complied with the demand

14

and was rewarded with the Democratic Presidential nomination. Roose­

velt, after striking such a bargain, would be required to walk a very

narrow foreign policy path in order to work with the isolationist group

in Congress and still maintain his legislative reform program.

FDR accepted the oath of office on the fourth of March, 1933, the

last President to do so on that date. The new President was confronted

with an economy that had deteriorated severely for the past three and

one-half years. Millions were unemployed, banks were closed, glutted

markets forced farm prices down, causing bankruptcies, and many factories

stood empty. The Democratic Party returned to power after twelve years

Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965) p, 146,

Ibid., pp. 148-149; See also Divine, Illusions, pp. 41-42.

31

of Republican rule, promising sweeping changes through Roosevelt's New

Deal economic reforms.

World affairs were also rapidly disintegrating, and some interna­

tionalists optimistically recalling FDR's career hoped for the promise

of changing patterns in America's role in the world. Although Roosevelt

had given assurance otherwise, his education, upbringing, previous

support of Wilson and his entire political career seemed to mark him an

internationalist. Others viewed FDR's first term in a completely

different light, possibly because he concentrated almost exclusively

upon the domestic crisis and allowed his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull

to attend to the details of foreign affairs. One author has labeled

Roosevelt's first term as his "isolationist phase," Dulles remarks

that:

Throughout his first term, Roosevelt concentrated on these vital domestic issues, leaving his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, as the latter has testified, almost in full charge of foreign policy. Moreover the President's ideas on the role that the United States should play in world affairs appeared to have undergone a definite shift since his four-sguare support for collective security as a loyal Wilsonian in 1920, He was generally content to have America stay at home. It was not until almost the eve of the European war, and his realization that everything that might have been accomplished by the New Deal on the domestic front and the very security of the nation were threatened by events abroad, that Roosevelt returned to his original internationalism.I^

It is not the intent here to argue this point with Dulles or the

isolationist title placed on FDR. Too many writers have already

attempted to determine the President's motives without any apparent

Divine, Illusions, p. 40.

Dulles, America's Rise, p. 168.

32

success. The facts do bear out that FDR was concerned and deeply

involved in the domestic crisis, and he did need those isolationists'

votes in Congress if his New Deal reform package was to succeed. Most

do agree that Roosevelt possessed a high degree of political skill, and

this may just have been a case of political expedience to push his

New Deal through a sometimes reluctant Congress.

Roosevelt's first administration inherited the World Disarmament

Conference, begun in 1932, and the London World Economic Conference of

1933 from the Republicans. Both Conferences were failures, in part

because the United States still refused to make any commitment to posi­

tive action. Other nations feared cutting back on armaments, without

additional guarantees from Britain and America, because of the recent

Japanese aggression and German resurgance. At the economic conference

the big stumbling block dealt with the moves to stabilize world cur­io

rencies, America was unwilling to tie itself to other nations' economy,

preferring that its government be allowed the freedom to guide its own

19 economic future, Adler underscores this belief with:

No nation was ready to make tariff sacrifices on the altar of general recovery, and if the dollar had been tied tightly to world exchange, it might well have impeded the New Deal's efforts to bring immediate relief to American debtors. In retrospect, the tragedy lay not in Roosevelt's message which undermined the conference, but in an all-pervading selfish nationalism which ruled a mutual recovery program out of the realm of political possibilities.20

Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 151,

1 g Dulles, America's Rise, pp. 169-170; Adler, Uncertain Giant,

pp. 150-152.

19 Ibid., pp. 169, 152.

20 / \ m c«r« I lt->OQT»'f-o-i t-t C-iorft- ry^ 1 5 3

33

Early in Roosevelt's first term, Hull expressed interest in

attempting another arms embargo resolution. On March 10, 1933,

Roosevelt agreed, and the State Department sent letters recommending such

action to Representative McReynolds and Senator Key Pittman. A week

later McReynolds introduced an arms embargo resulution identical to

the one he had sponsored in the previous Congress. Opponents labeled

the resolution an act of war, and that if passed, it would be unconsti­

tutional because it would allow the President to assume the war-making

powers reserved to Congress,

Hamilton Fish led a small minority of Republicans in the House

who feared that it was an attempt, by the Administration, to join the

League of Nations in sanctions against Japan. This fear of any European

involvement is a strong vein running through isolationist thought. The

very vocal minority were, in the end, incapable of preventing its pas­

sage. The House vote on the embargo demonstrated a partisan split,

with only nine Republicans supporting the resolution and twenty-three

21 Democrats opposing it. The resolution now faced the much stronger

isolationist Senate before becoming law.

Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

held no strong views on world affairs, but he was jealous of the Senate's

22 independence in developing foreign policy. Within the Committee, two

members frequently challenged his control—William E. Borah of Idaho

^^U,S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 13 Apr. 1933, 77:1690, 1695-1700; 17 Apr. 1933, 77:1849; Divine, Illusion, p. 47.

22 Divine, Illusion, p. 51.

34

and Hiram Johnson of California; both men were ultra-isolationists.

When the committee met, Johnson offered an amendment to the embargo

resolution which specified that any embargo levied by the President had

to apply equally to all belligerents.^^ Pittman later advised the

President that without the Johnson amendment the resolution would not

move out of committee. FDR quickly decided to approve it without

consulting with his Secretary of State. Hull was devastated by

Roosevelt's decision and urged defeat of the proposal rather than giving

in to compromise. Divine believes that Roosevelt only agreed to the

compromise to prevent a debate on foreign policy which might have

25 stalled his domestic reform presently in Congress.

If nothing became of the resolution, at least it caught the attention

of the peace groups, and their agitation against the arms industry

bore fruit with the appointment of a Senate investigating committee. The

findings of the Nye Committee and the reconsideration of World War I by

international lawyers provided grist for the isolationist mill. Divine

explains;

. . . This new concept of neutrality was quickly reinforced by historians, who now claimed that the economic ties between the United States and the Allies had led directly to American entry into World War I. These various groups beginning from different premises, all arrived at the same conclusion—the United States, instead of cooperating to prevent the outbreak of war, as the internationalists contended, should adopt a

23 Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 157.

2 A

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 73rd Cong,, 1st Sess,, 22 Apr. 1933, 77:2141; Divine, Illusion, p. 53.

Divine, Illusion, p. 55; Dulles, America's Rise, pp, 176-177.

35 stern policy of neutrality designed to insulate the nation from the wars of the future. And above all else, they advocated an impartial arms embargo which would deny the munitions makers their sordid profits and at the same time avoid American economic involvement in foreign conflicts,^^

The investigation and a spate of articles and books all aided in

giving credence to the assumption that the arms manufacturers were

guilty of a huge conspiracy to instigate and extend wars, and to

destroy efforts toward peace. The Committee later expanded its inves­

tigation to determine what part Wall Street and the White House had played

in this plot. In May of 1934, the President signed the Chaco War

resolution, which called for a ban on the sale of arms and munitions

to both Bolivia and Paraguay, where hostilities had begun in June of

27 1932 over a border dispute.

In 1933 an international lawyer, Charles Warren, who had served

as Assistant Attorney General before World War I, spoke before the

American Society of International Law. Warren voiced his views on

neutrality, arguing against the traditionalist approach, who favored

one-sided action against aggressors. He advanced the thesis that it

would be better to abandon all rights and secure whatever trade conces­

sions either belligerent would be willing to permit.

Warren advocated the adoption of a strict neutrality code which would insulate the United States from commercial and financial contact with foreign wars. Among other things, Warren suggested an impartial arms embargo on all belligerents, a ban on loans to warring governments, and a declaration by the United States warning all citizens that they traded with belligerents at their own risk , , , .2°

26 Divine, Illusion, pp, 57-58.

27 Ibid., p, 31.

^^Ibid., pp. 68-69.

36

On the heels of the Nye Committee findings came a book. Road to War

1914-1917, which gave validity to Nye's work. Written by Walter Millis,

an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune, the book argued

that America's entry into the war was due to a combination of rashness,

emotionalism, and the desire for profits. The author made the point

also that lack of a neutral policy and a distortion of Allied propoganda

29 were also important reasons for America going to war. Divine has

this to say about the Millis book and its effect upon Americans:

. . . Vividly written, the book appealed to a generation that was repelled by the horrors of war and was searching franti­cally for policies that could guarantee American abstention from future conflicts. The growing feeling that American entry into the war had been a tragic mistake now had a histori­cal sanction, and increasingly Americans came to believe that by learning from the errors of the past, they could secure immunity from the contagion of war.^0

Up until 1935, most Americans were not overly concerned about the

concept of neutrality. The subject had been discussed primarily between

international lawyers, concerned politicians, and State Department offi­

cials. At that time the nature and climate of the European crisis was

becoming more serious. The Nye Committee findings and the rash of books

and articles all threatened American security, unless the foreign policy

course was changed.

Early in 1935 Adolf Hitler announced that Germany would begin mili­

tary conscription in an effort to raise an army of half a million men.

Benito Mussolini had begun, late in 1934, to create incidents along the

29 Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 58; Divine, Illusion , p. 77;

Adler, Uncertain Giant, p, 165.

Divine, Illusion, p, 78.

37

Ethiopian-Somaliland border that would eventually culminate in an

Italian invasion. All of the factors mentioned above were invitations

for Americans to move toward neutrality. The plan advocated by Charles

Warren was widely discussed and ran along the same lines expressed by

the popular mood of the country. Warren's solution for neutrality

stressed an impartial arms embargo, a ban on loans to belligerents,

restrictions against traveling in wartime, and making all trade with

32 combatants subject to the risk of the buyer.

Roosevelt's administration had previously drafted neutrality legis­

lation. However a disagreement developed within the State Department

over whether the embargo should be discriminatory or impartial, and the

NaVy Department's opposition to the surrender of traditional neutral

rights delayed the submission of that draft. In the meantime, Roosevelt

suggested that the Nye Committee prepare its own neutrality legislation.

If the President was intent upon bringing the issue of neutrality before

Congress, his idea was successful. Within three weeks a flood of propo­

sals were introduced into both Houses of Congress. Nye and Bennett

C. Clark co-sponsored a resolution in the Senate. Representative Frank

Kloeb of Ohio introduced one in the House dealing with the prohibition of

loans, and Maury Maverick of Texas, advocating rigid neutrality, intro­

duced another to the House.

Peace groups, although rigid neutrality was not compatible with

32 Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 172.

^^New York Times, 11 Apr. 1935, p. 3; U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 Aug. 1935, 79:696-708, 5283, 10463, 10998, 13795.

38

their avowed goals, began exerting pressure upon Congress to force the

passage of such legislation. On August 20, Senators Bone, Clark,

Nye, and Vandenburg joined in a filibuster to force the Foreign Relations

Committee to bring a neutrality bill before the full Senate. These

gentlemen called upon the Senate for the passage of rigid neutrality

legislation, evoking the memories of the American blood shed and the

excessive profits garnered by the arms manufacturers of World War I.

Senator Pittman arrived a few hours later with a neutrality resolution

approved by his Committee. The bill was approved by the Senate the

next day and sent to the House for consideration. Roosevelt, after some

thought, agreed to the resolution, provided that the embargo be limited

to a six-month period. The House voted to accept the compromise and

passed the resolution on August 23, and the following day the Senate

accepted the amendments. It is interesting to note that Senator Hiram

Johnson of California, declared that the day was a triumph for isola­

tionists and the downfall of the internationalists.

The Neutrality Act passed by Congress gave the President the power

to proclaim an embargo of arms, munitions, and implements of war in the

event of hostilities between two or more foreign states. The Act also

created a National Munitions Control Board to license and oversee all

arms shipments and prohibited the carrying of munitions in American ships.

Additionally, it gave the President the discretion to prevent the shipment

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,

20 Aug. 1933, 79:13775-13793.

^^Ibid.; House, Congressional Record, 23 Aug. 1935, 79:14362.

39

of supplies from American ports to belligerents, a ban on entry of

submarines of countries at war into American territorial waters, and

the warning to American citizens that travel on belligerent ships was

at their own risk.

On February 29, 1936, Congress sent a replacement bill which

extended the neutrality provisions for fourteen months. The second

document also provided for a ban on loans to belligerent nations, and

Congress directed the President to extend the arms embargo to new belli-

gerents.

At this time it is important to pause at the year 1935, and discuss

the assumptions made by those who advocated isolationism. Some writers

utilize 1935 as "isolations triumph," or its golden year, the year that

38 Americans woke up to the isolationist cause. Isolationism during the

1930s is of interest because the movement attracted such diverse groups.

Although their goals were not identical and there was frequent disagree­

ment among them, they combined to fight Roosevelt's administration

over the threat of American participation in World War II. Those iden­

tified as "isolationist" would surely disagree with the label, and in

the basic meaning of the word as applied to China and Japan, they were

not isolationists. However, the term was used, and still is used today,

to identify those who strongly opposed America's entry into World War II.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 Aug.1935 , 79:14282; 24 Aug. 1935, 79:14430-14434; Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 173.

U.S, Congress, House, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 28 Feb. 1936, 80:3445.

3R Adler, Uncertain Giant, pp. 173-175.

40

The defenders of isolationism were quick to recall and quote the

Founding Fathers, agreeing that it was more desirable for America to

retain its freedom of unilateral action. To the isolationist this

meant the avoidance wherever possible, of any alliance or agreement that

bound the United States to another nation in the defense of common

interests. Manfred Jonas provides an explanation of Washington's Fare­

well Address that may help explain this assumption;

Washington merely drew hardheaded inferences from two circum­stances; the United States was too weak to induce any major powers of which it might become an ally to consider American interests more than incidentally; and this country's favorable geographic position did not require it to join defensive al­liances . . . . 3^

This use of Washington and later of Jefferson to provide a basis

for isolationism in the thirties was taken out of context. In 1935,

the United States was a world power. The rapid development in transpor­

tation and communication suggested problems that were nonexistent in

Washington's day, and World War I had demonstrated how far the science

and technology of weapons and war had advanced.

Isolationism demands that America must retain its freedom of choice

in foreign policy decisions, and yet insists that the United States

avoid war at all costs. If America has freedom of choice, then war must

also be one of those choices. The isolationist of the thirties opposed

both wars and entanglements as if they were synonymous. In this manner

40 they were able to attract support from the nationalist and the pacifist.

This inconsistency became more difficult for the isolationist to defend

39 Jonas, Isolationism In America, p. 9.

^°Ibid., pp. 15-17.

41

as the war drew nearer.

Another assumption involved the reassessment of war guilt from the

First World War. As previously mentioned, there was a flood of revi­

sionist articles and books clearing Germany of any war guilt and charging

the responsibility for the war to everything from Wilson's internationa­

lism. Allied propoganda, unwise economic management, or to the arms

industry. American entry into the war had neither solved the threat of

further war nor had it made the world safe for democracy. Without

looking at the differences between the two periods, isolationists used

these charges as proof that unilaterialism was the only way to insure

41 against the reoccurrence of the war, Jonas emphasizes how revisionism

aided the isolationist cause:

The spread of revisionist thinking, combined with the effects of the Depression and the threat of war in Europe and Asia, produced a climate of opinion in America that made all dealings with foreign nations suspect. An isolationist policy appealed not only to those who had always questioned the wisdom of in­creased American participation in world affairs, but also to the disappointed idealists who had earlier supported interna­tionalism . . . , 2

While isolationism appealed to many different groups, and there

were numerous anti-war organizations, there was little clear concensus

of goals between these groups. There was one exception, however; the

majority agreed that a strict embargo was needed.

Isolationists rejected international cooperation as a means to

solve the war crisis, working on the assumption that a war in Europe or

-•"Ibid., pp. 27-31.

^^Ibid., p. 31.

42

Asia did not threaten the vital interests of the United States. Again

they were falling back on the words of the Founding Fathers; it did not

matter to America which nation won or lost a particular war. Senator

Borah defended the Monroe Doctrine Clause as a necessary part of the

League Covenant if America were to join that organization. Borah main­

tained that the United States could not share the Doctrine with any

other nation either in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere. They also

assumed that if war came in Asia, it would not involve the same dangers

as would one in Europe,

Isolationists also attempted to justify German and Italian action,

suggesting that since Great Britain and France were the ones who had

plundered the other two, it was only just for them to use aggression in

return. Isolationists viewed the European conflict as an attempt by

the League to preserve the boundaries set up by the Versailles Treaty

and, as such, were not related to the question of morality. Jonas re­

inforces this thought with:

The isolationists' failure to see a fundamental moral issue in the European struggle led them to regard the conflict as a jockeying for power among nations who did not deserve the sympathy or support of the United States.' ^

It was not difficult, once one has resigned oneself to this idea, to find

many instances in which Britain and France took over a country in much

the same manner as Italy.

This is related to the assumption that isolationism refused to

consider the reguirement that America assume a world role. If there

Kennedy, Monroe Doctrine, p. 17.

Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 111.

43

was nothing America could do to solve the European problems, then the

United States did not have any moral duty to join the war. Therefore,

America did not have any direct reason for fighting a foreign war.

Another concept that isolationists assumed was the long held belief

that America's geographic isolation, with its natural barriers and

oceans, made the country impregnable. They believed that this country

was safe from war, that even if war spread further, America could not

be successfully attacked if an adequate Army and Navy were maintained.

The American people and especially isolationists wanted to believe

Hitler when he stated that Germany was not contemplating an attack on

America. Military preparedness was advocated by most isolationists,

and those in Congress demonstrated their willingness to increase the

military in order to attain an impregnable defense.

Jonas provides a good summary of the assumptions that have been

discussed:

The isolationists of the thirties built much of their position on the belief that the United States lacked a substantial motive for going to war but had vital reasons for remaining at peace. Like all Americans, they knew this country desired no additional territory. They be­lieved the world situation offered no more requirement for American intervention because they saw no struggle of good against evil and believed the United States to be powerless to bring about a just solution to interna­tional problems. They were sure the United States could not and would not be attacked and had no need, therefore, to forstall the rise of a possible aggressor.^^

The second Neutrality Act of February 29, 1936, reflected the

^^Ibid., p. 129,

^^Ibid., p. 134

44

increasing popularity and strength of isolationism. The League of

Nations Council was still vacillating over whether or not to add oil

to the embargo list against Italy. As mentioned earlier. Congress

changed the wording of the new Neutrality Act. The old law gave the

President the discretion in extending the arms embargo to new belli­

gerents, and under the new act the President was "directed," to embargo

all new belligerents.

The year 1936 was not a good year for President Roosevelt. The

first embargo act in 1935 had been a compromise that he thought would

deny aid to Italy in its war against Ethiopia. After the beginning of

the war, FDR found that Italy needed raw materials rather than arms,

and that the embargo instead worked against the Ethiopians, who

desperately needed munitions. Now the passage of the 1936 act tied his

hands even further by taking away the discretion allowed to him by the

1935 bill.

As America attempted to withdraw from events in Europe, and the

faltering diplomacy of the Western Europeans was drying up. Hitler took

an enormous gamble and marched his troops into the Rhineland. Hitler

ran a tremendous bluff with his invasion, for if France and Britain had

faced that challenge with force, they would have found Germany at its

weakest moment.

U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.,

28 Feb. 1936, 80:3445.

48 Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 176; Dulles, America's Rise,

p. 172.

45

The age of conflict and crisis was only just beginning. On July

17, 1936, the revolt of an army garrison in Spanish Morocco, led by

Francisco Franco, soon spread to the Spanish mainland, and a civil war

was added to an already threatened world. The outbreak of Spain's

civil war did not appear, at the outset, to involve or affect American

neutrality. The following month both Germany and Italy offered

Franco's Rebels aid, and in response the Soviet Union stepped in to

lend support to Spain's Loyalist government.

What had begun as a civil war quickly presumed an ideological

discord between Communism and Fascism. American neutrality legislation

had failed to mention the possibility of civil war; therefore, the

administration was unable to invoke the embargo. Officially the Ameri­

can government did not join Britain and France in their efforts to

prevent war materials from reaching either side. Although administra­

tion officials were sympathetic toward a formal embargo, they instead

49 relied upon a public announcement of a moral embargo. This moral

embargo, which asked citizens to avoid anything that might be construed

as interference in the Spanish Civil War, was at first widely observed.

Isolationists favored the embargo as a safeguard against American

involvement, and collective security supporters saw the embargo as a

method of cooperation with Britain and France in their efforts.

The Spanish conflict caused some isolationists to stop and reflect

upon the wisdom of an arms embargo. One such individual was Norman

49 Adler, Uncertain Giant, pp. 176-181; Divine, Illusion, pp.

168-172.

46

Thomas, the Socialist party leader, who had originally favored neutrality

legislation, but now had doubts, Thomas made written appeals to the

President and to Chairman McReynolds of the House Foreign Affairs Com­

mittee, opposing the application of neutrality laws to the Spanish Civil

War,

Thomas favored allowing arms for the Loyalist government, even at

the expense of allowing Americans to make a profit from the civil war.

Other liberal and radical isolationists realized that under international

law, it was proper and legal for the United States to bar trade with the

fascist rebels, while continuing to supply the legal government of Spain

with munitions. Roosevelt disagreed with these arguments, believing that

an arms embargo would be both a popular and painless method of cooperating

with Britain and France; it would also be advantageous to the Spanish

Loyalists. FDR insisted that since the rebels held more control over

shipping than did the loyalists, the rebels would benefit more from any

American shipments.

In January of 1937, after several requests to ship war materials to

the Spanish government, the administration decided to ask for congres­

sional action on a civil war embargo. In compliance with this reguest.

Senator Pittman introduced a joint resolution on January 6, calling for

an embargo of arms to both sides of the Spanish Civil War, McReynolds

introduced the resolution in the House at the same time, stressing the

need for speedy passage because the State Department had been forced to

50 Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 186-188.

" Ibid., p. 187.

47

52 grant several licenses to individuals for shipment of arms to Spain.

The resolution was quickly passed in both Houses of Congress, and

in the House there was but one dissenting vote. In February, Represen­

tative Voorhis presented a statement to the House, signed by thirty-one

fellow supporters, who favored neutrality legislation and pointed out

that if the embargo is enforced against Spain, but not against those

nations who were supplying arms to the rebels, then the United States

was, in effect, a cobelligerent with those attempting to overthrow the

Spanish government. The Spanish Civil War resolution gave the Presi­

dent authority to rescind the embargo only if the war should end.

Some isolationists were guided by their desire to follow the Ameri­

can tradition of aid and recognition to a duly elected government. The

liberals and radicals among them also acted out of sympathy for the

Loyalists, which affected their judgement on neutrality. In March,

1937, debate began on a new neutrality bill. In the Senate, isola­

tionists attempted to block the provision that contained discretionary

cash-and-carry. Senators Borah and Johnson tried to discredit the

provision by labeling it a "British measure," but when the vote was

counted, only four other isolationists joined the two senators in

52 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st

Sess., 6 Jan. 1937, 81:86; Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 180; Divine, Illusion, pp. 170-171; Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 189-191.

53 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong,, 1st

Sess,, 2 Feb, 1937, 81: app. 130; Divine, Illusion, pp. 169-171. Robert Cuse, a New Jersey scrap dealer, was granted permission on December 28, 1937, to sell $2 million worth of airplane parts and engines to the Loyalists. Congress was acting upon the legislation just as a Spanish ship loaded with six airplanes and one engine left the New York harbor. The ship eventually fell into Spanish Rebel hands.

48

., 54 opposing the cash-abd-carry provision.

The House debate was more spirited. Hamilton Fish called the idea

of cash-and-carry completely un-American. The House did manage to

place a two-year limit on this provision, then voted heavily in favor

of the resolution. Further attempts were made in the Senate to block

the resolution. This time complaints were made against the greater

discretion given to the President, but finally most isolationists voted

for the measure in the interest of maintaining American neutrality.

The largest fear that isolationists had of the new legislation was that

it favored those nations with large merchant navies, notably England

and Japan.

Americans in general, seemed to agree with Isolationists when it

came to the idea of keeping America out of the war. Gallup polls taken

during this period reflect the thinking that American foreign policy

should be directed toward efforts at keeping America from entering the

war, and that idea held true even up to the time the United States

actually entered the war. Most of the peace organizations worked dili­

gently for mandatory legislation. They assailed the President and the

State Department with letters and telegrams, pleading for the embargo

of all war materials and a rigid control over other trade. A few

U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 Mar. 1937, 81:1791-1807.

^^U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 Mar, 1937, 81:2162-2168,

^^George H. Gallup, Public Opinion 1935-1971, (Random House, New York, 1972) pp. 1-311.

49

pacifist groups favoring international cooperation, such as the League

of Nations Association, sent every congressman a pamphlet urging

discretionary legislation allowing the President to embargo arms to

nations violating the Kellogg pact.

The neutrality bloc, after two years of heated debate in Congress,

succeeded in combining its isolationist assumptions into permanent

legislation. As each aggressive world crisis occurred, Americans began

to discover that the application of neutrality also meant a shared

58 relationship with the totalitarian nations.

The outbreak of undeclared war between Japan and China posed certain

problems for the conduct of American foreign policy. Roosevelt delayed

any final decision to invoke the embargo, preferring to wait for further

developments. Since there had been no declaration of war by either

side, nor had diplomatic relations between the two nations been broken,

FDR could maintain that a state of war did not exist, and therefore the

neutrality law did not apply. China relied upon America entirely for

their munitions; Japan did not, therefore, to invoke an embargo would

greatly benefit Japan.

As the China crisis continued, isolationists in Congress, the

peace movement, and the press began to criticize FDR's administration

59 for its inaction. Senators Nye and Clark issued a public statement

on August 18, reminding the President that the purpose of the neutrality

Divine, Illusion, p. 182.

^^Ibid., p. 200.

^^New York Times, 18 Aug. 1937, p. 4.

50

act was to insure American abstention from war. Isolationists were

convinced that as long as the United States supplied arms to any of the

participants, eventually America would be drawn into the war. In a

radio interview two days later, Nye repeated his statement, and to

support his argument, stated that the law would hurt Japan as well as

China by preventing loans to finance Japanese purchases of raw

materials. The editors of the Christian Century and the New Republic

demanded that the President invoke the neutrality law, warning that not

to do so would lead to disaster for the nation.

Internationalists strongly endorsed Roosevelt's policy. The New

York Times lauded Roosevelt's inaction, declaring that to implement

formal neutrality at this time would reduce the chanc^ of a peaceful

62 settlement of the crisis in China. Most Americans, outside of the

isolationists' circles, gave their unspoken approval to the administra­

tion's policy as there was no general public demand for employing the

neutrality act. A Gallup poll, in early August, asked Americans which

side they favored in the Chinese crisis. Fifty-five per cent favored

neither side; 43 per cent named China; and 2 per cent selected Japan.

A group of congressmen that included Koppleman, Voorhis, Southoff,

Amlie, Ludlow, Fish, and Knutson pressed FDR to declare China and Japan

^°U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., app., 19 Aug. 1937, 81:2187; 21 Aug. 1937, app., 81:2257.

" "Apply the Neutrality Law," Christian Century, LIV, 11 Aug. 1937, 989-991; "Scuttle or Bluster," New Republic, XCII, 15 Sept. 1937, 243-244.

62 New York Times, 19 Aug. 1937, p. 18.

^^Gallup, Public Opinion, 9 Aug. 1937, p. 69.

51

at war. They insisted that invoking the neutrality act would make the

situation more equal for both nations. Additionally, to continue

shipments of war materials to China might involve the United States in

64 war.

Jonas explains isolationists' feelings and the dilemma they

found themselves in:

The isolationists' response to the crisis in Ethiopia, Spain, and China, and their acceptance of the cash-and-carry principle not only demonstrate the existence of isolationist beliefs that were unrelated to admiration or hatred for a given country; they also throw considerable light on a basic isolationist dilemma: measures designed to disentangle the United States from world affairs brought results running counter to that aim whenever they were applied to a specific situation. In every existing conflict, and in all those that could be fore­seen, American neutrality legislation had the effect of aiding one side or the other. Since isolationists had tried to elimi­nate this dangerous contingency through Congressional action, their efforts to promote true neutrality through legislation must be considered a failure.^^

The appearance of one crisis after another, during the thirties,

tested the American Neutrality Law, and each new crisis undermined the

isolationists' position and drifted the United States closer to a

world war. The continuing Japanese aggression in China and the persis­

tent pressure from Chinese authorities caused the State Department to

reevaluate their policy. By the end of September, 1937, a final

decision had still not been reached on a forthright stand on the

Chinese crisis. On October 5 in Chicago, Roosevelt delivered a major

64 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st

Sess., 19 Aug. 1937, 81: app. 2196-2197.

Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 202-203.

52

address on foreign policy. In this address, Roosevelt blamed 10 per

cent of the world's population for the present reign of terror. The

President observed, "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to

spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients

in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of

disease,"

This address was guickly dubbed, "the quarantine speech," and

although the President failed to specify what measures he advocated or

the aggressors by name, most of his contemporaries saw the speech as

a change in his outlook on world affairs. Isolationists were guick

to condemn Roosevelt's speech, while internationalists perceived it as

a welcome move toward collective security. When Congress returned in

November, Hamilton Fish led other Republicans in attacking the President

for his failure to proclaim American neutrality toward the war in China,

Fish recalled the charge levelled at FDR in the past, that his refusal 68

was a "step toward fascism," Representative Everett M, Dirksen of

Illinois asserted that the President was influenced by an unneutral

policy toward China, Dirksen reminded the President that he himself was

willing to confine his thinking to the democracy that exists between

69 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

^^U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, XVII, 9 Oct, 1937, pp. 276-279.

^^Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech." Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (Sept., 1957) 405-433.; Borg argues that Roosevelt was only attempting to find some means of forestalling war, and not the vital change in foreign policy that others saw.

^^U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 Nov. 1937, 81:8156-8158.

^^Ibid., 18 Nov. 1937, 81:144-145.

53

Although isolationism seemed stronger than ever, by 1938 a

vigorous attack against rigid neutrality legislation was begun in the

winter and spring. Members from both houses of Congress introduced

over twenty resolutions, ranging from the repeal of the 1937 act to

amendments which would allow discriminatory embargoes against aggres­

sive nations. The internationalist wing of the peace movement renewed

its demands for a more flexible policy, and the Committee for Peace

Through World Cooperation demanded immediate revision of the arms

embargo so that it applied solely to aggressors. Although these

drives and persistent pleas for repeal of the Neutrality Act ended in

failure, it did bring the wisdom of neutrality into question.

In September, 1938 Hitler, encouraged by his swift seizure of

Austria, threatened war over his demands that Czechoslovakia withdraw

from the Sudeten area. A last-ditch appeal by Mussolini resulted in

the Munich Conference, in which Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier,

Prime Ministers of Britain and France, surrendered the Sudetenland in

return for Hitler's promise to end his expansionism. This "appeasem*nt"

of Hitler and the aversion of war was welcome news for many Americans.

In a Gallup poll taken early in 1939, the people were asked if they

believed there would be a war between any of the big European countries

this year, and 44 per cent responded with a yes; 44 per cent with a no.

In a companion guestion asking if they thought America would be drawn

into that war, 57 per cent replied yes, and 43 per cent no. Most

70 New York Times, 22 Jan. 1938, p. 4; 5 Apr. 1938, p. 11

" - Ibid., 22 Jan. 1938, p. 4.

54

Americans seemed concerned that if war continued in Europe that the

77 United States would eventually become involved.

The move for revision of the neutrality law began in the State

Department in the fall of 1938, but the administration remained silent

on the subject. When Congress assembled on January 4, 1939, both

isolationists and internationalists eagerly awaited for Roosevelt's

address. The President's "measures short of war" speech brought an

instant response from Congress and the nation's press. The New York

•7-7

Times called his statement a turning point in American foreign policy.

Robert A. Taft of Ohio stated that "the logical conclusion is another

war with American troops sent across the ocean." John Rankin, Democratic

Representative from Mississippi, charged that FDR's new policy was the

product of foreign influence, which he explained were Communist agitators

and greedy arms manufacturers.

Roosevelt, worried over the intense reactions to his speech,

accepted a suggestion from Senator Pittman to allow his committee to

hold public hearings in the movement for the revision of neutrality

legislation. The hearings had just begun when Pittman announced its

adjournment. The reason for the postponement was the reintroduction

of the arms embargo issue involving the Spanish Civil War. Roosevelt,

because of opposition from Congress and general public opinion, was

forced to play a waiting game on the revision of neutrality.

^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Jan, 12, 1939) p. 137,

• New York Times, 5 Jan, 1939, pp. 1, 22,

^^Ibid., 11 Jan. 1939, p. 13.

55

Adolf Hitler's aggression finally forced FDR's hand and pushed

Congress to act on neutrality revision. On March 15, 1939, the German

army marched into Czechoslovakia, and in a very short time had taken

over the government, in violation of Hitler's pledge at the Munich

Conference, Pittman quickly introduced a bill in Congress giving the

President sweeping discretion and repeal of the Neutrality Act of

1937, The isolationists in the Senate,, led by Borah, strongly

condemned the proposal to repeal the arms embargo. Instead of selling

war materials, Borah wanted the United States to proclaim to the

world, "We will not contribute in any way to mass murder."

After receiving protests from the Chinese on the subject of

repeal, Roosevelt reversed his original stand and effectively withdrew

his support from the repeal efforts. In a Gallup poll taken on May

20, 1939, 72 per cent of those polled expressed their approval of a

ban on the sale of war materials to Japan. Despite public hearings,

and a large number of witnesses who supported repeal, in the end, no

consensus was reached by the committee. During the hearings the debate

had spread to the nation's press, and not unlike the committee, their

efforts also ended in confusion. The expiration of the cash-and-carry

provisions of the neutrality bill on May 1 produced a pressing need for

some sort of decision. Further efforts were made with a resolution

introduced in the House by Sol Bloom of New York, who had replaced

the ailing McReynolds on the Foreign Relations Committee.

^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong.,

1st Sess., 20 Mar. 1939, 84:292'5-2926.

•^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (20 May 1^39) p. 160.

56

In the House debate of Bloom's bill. Fish stated, "It is utterly

impossible to sell arms to any belligerent without being involved in

war ourselves within a very short time." Near the end of his statement

Fish ridiculed the Bloom resolution with, "A rose by any other name

smells as sweet, but the Bloom bill without the embargo on arms is

just as bad, and that is the issue before us."

In early July the debate shifted to the Senate, and Senator Pittman

after delaying committee action for several days, finally convened the

meeting to consider the question of neutrality. In the meantime, both

the State Department and the neutrality bloc applied intense pressure

upon the committee members. Secretary Hull and other cabinet officers

met with the Democratic members pleading for repeal of the embargo law,

and even Roosevelt used his personal influence to persuade individual

78 committee members to repeal the legislation. At the same time,

isolationist leaders Nye, Hiram Johnson, and Bennett C. Clark began

organizing a solid bloc of senators to support the arms embargo, A

group of thirty-four senators threatened to filibuster if the Senate

79 Committee reported favorably on the administration's proposals.

On July 11, when Pittman called his committee to order. Senator

Clark made a motion to postpone consideration of the neutrality

legislation until 1940, The vote to postpone was carried by a margin

U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,

27 June 1939, 84:7983-7984,

7R New York Times, 9 July 1939, p. 1.

79 Divine, Illusion, p. 277.

57

of 12 to 11, thereby ending six months of intense work by the adminis­

tration. The New York Times called the Senate action "an invitation to

an

aggressor nations to use war to achieve their conquests," A Gallup

poll taken in June showed that 80 per cent of those interviewed still

favored the sale of arms to England and France in a general war. Yet

a month later, 51 per cent of those questioned indicated that they

thought Congress was right in retaining the arms embargo, with 37 per 81

cent disagreeing and 12 per cent expressing no opinion. Americans

were only slowly beginning to understand that the United States could

not escape from the events abroad by withdrawing. Hitler's invasion of

Czechoslovakia and his increasingly brutal persecution of Jews inside

of Germany, slowly but surely sickened Americans. The question of neu­

trality was becoming a stalemate both inside and outside of Congress.

Roosevelt had attempted to remain outside of the congressional

debate over repeal of the arms embargo, realizing his support for repeal

might in itself bring failure. FDR's strategy backfired; his opponents

fought against the administration's proposal despite his low profile.

Divine suggests that since the opposition defeated FRD's efforts anyway,

that a bolder, more active role might have been better. Roosevelt might

87 still have lost the fight, but he might have won.

On September 1, 1939, Roosevelt received the news that the frontiers

of Poland had been crossed by the German army, Roosevelt was convinced.

p. 18,

81

^°New York Times, 12 July 1939, p. 9; 20 July 1939,

Gallup, Public Opinion, (June 13, 1940) p. 230.

" " ^ n i v z - i n o n i i i G - i n r . o 9 f l S .

58

more than ever, that the United States must repeal the arms embargo in

order to aid England and France. The setback in Congress the previous

spring made him more cautious of isolationist strength, but FDR was

determined to push for repeal. Backing up this determination was a

Gallup poll conducted just after the outbreak of war which revealed that

public opinion on the arms embargo was changing. Fifty-seven per cent

83 favored repeal of the arms law, while 43 per cent disagreed.

Checking with administration leaders in Congress, FDR learned that

approximately sixty senators would now vote for repeal of the neutrality

act. All the signs looked favorable toward repeal, and Roosevelt called

a special session of Congress on September 21. This time FDR personally

supervised a campaign to win back the support he needed in Congress.

Roosevelt addressed Congress, stressing his determination to keep the

nation firmly on the path of peace, and concluded with an appeal to the

desire to stay out of the war;

Destiny first made us, with our sister nations on this hemisphere, joint heirs of European culture. Fate now seems to compel us to assume the task of helping to maintain in the western world a citadel wherein that civilization may be kept alive. The peace, the integrity, and the safety of the Americans—these must be kept firm and serene.^^

Isolationists launched an appeal to public opinion in a fight for

the embargo and for their very existence. Using radio, newspapers.

^"^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Sept. 13, 1939), p. 181.

g A

U.S. Congress, Joint Session, Congressional Record, 76th Cong.,

2nd Sess., 21 Sept. 1939, 85:10-12.

59

pamphlets, mail campaigns, and mass rallies, isolationists began an

intense effort to persuade the American people to reject the President's

program. There was a corresponding deluge of mail which fell upon

85 Washington's congressmen. Americans, assaulted by pressures from

both the isolationist bloc and the supporters of neutrality revision,

slowly began to swing into line with the President's program. In a

Gallup poll taken after the President's address to Congress, 62 per

cent favored repeal, and by October those who favored repeal leveled

off to 60 per cent. Regional breakdowns indicate that every section

favored repeal, with the strongest backing coming from the South, and

86 the least, 55 per cent coming from the Middle West. As the debate

continued, the administration won valuable support from international

lawyers.

Prominent Republicans then began announcing that they would support

repeal. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and Wallace M. White of Maine

announced their support. The Republican Club voted 46 to 6 in favor

of the administration's neutrality program. A week later. Senator George

W. Norris of Nebraska, who had voted against war in 1917, asked for

revision of the embargo on a national radio broadcast.

On September 26, Pittman presented a bill that repealed the arms

^^New York Times, 21 Sept. 1939, p. 16;22 Sept. 1939, p. 15; 27 Sept. 1939, p. 24; "Peace Blizzard," Newsweek, XIV, 2 Oct. 1939, 29.

^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Sept. 21, 1939) p. 183; Ibid., (Oct. 5, 1939) p. 186.

^'^"U.S. is Made Rigidly Neutral," Newsweek XIV, 18 Sept. 1939, 28; New York Times, 27 Sept. 1939, p. 16.

60

embargo, but in every other aspect it embodied the philosophy of

mandatory neutrality, and the Senate bill limited Presidential authority

to a minimum. The measure was considered by the full Senate on October

2, with Pittman and Borah making the opening statements for their re­

spective side. Borah claimed the real demand for repeal, "came from

the war hounds of Europe." Claiming that the true motive of the

administration was to aid England and France, he called repeal, "an

act of intervention." Turning to cash-and-carry, he denounced that

provision as a clever subterfuge designed to stimulate a vast war boom

in the United States. When the allies ran out of money, the adminis­

tration would induce Congress to end the ban on loans, and once again

the United States would find itself drawn into a bloody European

-, . ,88 conflict.

Senator Vandenberg, in support of Borah, delivered a speech in

which he declared, "In the long run, I do not believe we can become an

arsenal for one belligerent without becoming a target for another."

Almost every senator who spoke against the Pittman bill repeated this

89 charge, calling repeal "the first step toward war." While the Senate

moved slowly in its deliberations, American commercial interests began

a lobbying effort to force a liberalization of the cash-and-carry

gg U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd

Sess., 2 Oct. 1939, 85:66-73. 89 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd

Sess., 4 Oct. 1939, 85:9598; 10 Oct. 1939, 85:250-252; 12 Oct. 1939, 85:325.

61

provision. Pittman finally bowed to the pressures from the business

community, and amendments were prepared for their purpose.

Isolationists also offered a series of amendments which were

heavily defeated, and on October 27, the Senate voted 63 to 30 to pass

the Pittman bill. After four weeks of intensive debate, the adminis-

90 tration had achieved its longed-for goal. All that then remained

for the administration was to work toward influencing the outcome of

the bill in the House. On October 31, the House began consideration,

and for the next three days, engaged in a fierce, outspoken, and bitter

debate over the neutrality issue. House opponents used much the same

arguments expressed in the Senate, but in the end, they too accepted

repeal. The final votes, after a conference committee, passed the

Pittman bill by a margin of 55 to 24 in the Senate and 243 to 172 in

91 the House. Roosevelt and his administration were overjoyed with the

news of final passage. The repeal of the arms embargo and the adoption

of a limited cash-and-carry formula gave England and France their

brightest news in some time.

Neutralist legislation, as the hope of isolationists to prevent

America from becoming embroiled in the European struggle, was over.

The legislation, developed by a small neutrality bloc in Congress, was

designed to prevent the nation from becoming involved in a number of

world conflicts, each with its own basis and each under its own set of

^°Ibid., 27 Oct. 1939, 85:1022-1024.

^^Ibid., 3 Nov. 1939, 85:1352-1356, 85:1381-1388.

62

peculiar circ*mstances. Yet world events had convinced most Americans,

by the end of 1939, that the moral causes, for which the European

democracies were fighting, were also the causes which were important to

the United States. Neutrality legislation had been repealed, and the

loss was felt deeply by the isolationists, but that loss did not bring

an end to isolationism itself.

Americans still favored supplying Britain and France with aid, but

they stopped short of advocating United States intervention. Gallup

polls in October and November showed 60 per cent favored aid to the

Allies, but 95 per cent responded that America should not send its army

92 and navy abroad to fight. The success of Hitler's Blitzkrieg cast

further doubts upon the concept of American impregnability. Poland fell

in only twenty-seven days, and in April, 1940, Germany began the rapid

conquest of Denmark, Holland, Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The

surrender of France after only six weeks of fighting brought many

Americans to the realization that after Europe it might be America's

4- 93 turn.

The decline in sentiment toward the isolationist concept was re­

flected in changing Congressional attitudes, when a large number of

Congressmen who originally supported the arms embargo, later voted for

its repeal. The changing mood in public opinion further reduced isola­

tionist support. Hardcore isolationists, although slightly less in

97 GalluD, Public Opinion. (Oct. 23, 1939) p. 186; (3 Nov. 1939)

p. 188.

93 Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 215

63

number, still clung to their basic assumptions and employed the same

arguments that, in the course of world events, were unrealistic. In

answer to the charges of aggression and atrocities blamed on the Axis

Powers, D. Worth Clark of Idaho countered with the same charges against

Britain's policies in Ireland, pointing out that it was "ten times as

bloody in the 500 years of British destruction, pillage, rape, and

bloodshed in Ireland." Senator Rush Hold of West Virginia added the

French bombing of Damascus in 1925 to the list of "crimes" perpetrated

94 by the Democracies.

Isolationists continued their fight against American entry into the

European war with numerous books, pamphlets, newspaper and magazine

articles, radio broadcasts, and rallies, stressing the same points over

and over again. Members of Congress also did their share by expressing

these sentiments in the Congressional Record. Nye alone, filled ten pages

of the Record just to catalog the sins of the British Empire. Repudia­

tion of the war debts from the First World War was freguently criticized.

War in Europe was still considered of no vital interest to the United

States.

In their desperate search for justification of their positions,

isolationists were moving further and further away from reality. In

94 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess,,

12 Oct, 1939, 85:332. 95 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,

5 Feb, 1941, 87:543, 598, 560; 20 Feb, 1941, 1412; 24 Feb, 1941, 1295, 1296; 26 Feb. 1941, 1414, 1432; 4 Mar. 1941, 1724-1733.

64

January, 1941, in the Congressional debate over the Lend-Lease bill,

isolationists argued that this measure, designed to help Great Britain,

would not solve the problems facing Europe. Most isolationists expressed

the view that they hoped that Britain would win the war but were still

96 reluctant to grant Lend-Lease.

When the Lend-Lease bill was introduced in the House, isolationists

offered another proposal. The proposal was for extending a credit of

two billion dollars to Britain for the purchase of war materials in

the United States. Fish made the motion to send the bill back to the

committee to prepare a bill for the loan, but the motion was defeated

160 to 263. In the Senate, Taft proposed the loan as a substitute in

97

the form of an amendment, and it too was defeated 29 to 62. The sug­

gestion of a loan was something of a compromise for the isolationists,

but given the mood of the country, refusal to aid Britain would not

be favorably received by the electorate. In a Gallup poll taken in

January, Americans approved of the concept by 68 per cent, while 26 per no

cent disapproved and 6 per cent were undecided.

Isolationists, even up to the attack at Pearl Harbor, insisted

that an Axis victory was not detrimental to the well-being of the

United States. Their justification for this argument was the absence

of moral issues and the impregnability of the Western Hemisphere. The

^^Ibid., 4 Feb. 1941, 87:547.

• Ibid., 6 Feb. 1941, 87:711; 8 Feb. 1941, 815; 8 Mar. 1941, 2079-2082.

98 Gallup, Public Opinion, (Jan. 11, 1941) p. 262

65

Congressional Record is filled with these assertions, and Representative

Knute Hill of Washington observed: "Hitler with all his power cannot

cross twenty miles of English Channel and penetrate England. How can

he possibly cross the Atlantic and land troops in the Western Hemis-

99 phere?"

In 1941, isolationists made two desperate attempts to further their

cause. One attempt involved a drive toward some kind of war referendum,

but all such efforts failed. The other venture was an attempt, through

private investigations, to establish that the American movement toward

war was the result of well-organized groups representing a small minority

of the people. The "Devil theory of war," earlier suggested by Charles

A. Beard, gained new prominence. Charles A. Lindbergh, the aviator whose

speeches were highly beneficial for the America First Organization,

delivered a speech in Des Moines, Iowa on September 11, 1941. In that

speech Lindbergh named the three most important groups who have been

pushing America toward war—the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt

Administration." Because of these inopportune remarks and the re­

sultant criticism, Lindbergh's effectiveness as a speaker was seriously

damaged.

War, the great bugbear of isolationism, was closer than most

realized, but because of their assumptions, isolationists were largely

immune to world events. Most Americans no longer shared their views

99 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,

3 Feb. 1941, 87:487; 4 Feb. 1941, 528-529; 5 Feb- 1941, 590, 620.

^"^New York Times, 12 Sept. 1941, p. 1.

GG

after 1939. The remaining isolationists continued to assert their

principles even more vigorously as December 7, 1941 approached.

The isolationists of the thirties, the model selected here for

comparison, consisted primarily of the belief that aversion of inter­

national affairs and the impregnability of the United States made

intervention in a foreign war unnecessary; the United States became

involved in war through the manipulations of a few selfish, greedy

men; and since all other countries are amoral, warlike, or vulnerable,

the United States must cling to a policy of unilateralism in foreign

policy, Jonas states:

Fear of war exists to some extent in all men, and the desire for unilateral action is common to most individuals and all nations. The universali­ty of these basic emotions, which combined to form the isolationism of the thirties, makes isolationism permanently attractive and produces at least a nos­talgic yearning for it whenever world events become too unpleasant to contemplate with equanimity ,-'--'-

As defined, the isolationism of the thirties, is deficient of

political, economic, or social bases. It cannot be labeled strictly

liberal nor conservative, capitalist nor socialist, fascist nor com­

munist, democratic nor republican. Now it is time to turn to Post-World

II, and the changes in foreign policy, toward the cold war with Russia,

and the ideas of globalism and containment.

Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 275.

CHAPTER IV

LIMITED WAR

Chapter I presented the general purpose of the paper and the

intent of using the 1930 group of isolationists to compare and con­

trast with the individuals who would later oppose the Korean and Viet­

nam Wars. Chapter II established the basis of isolationism and the

efforts toward neutrality legislation. American opposition to the

League of Nations and the World Court, and the individuals and groups

of isolationists. In Chapter III, the isolationists' movement was

traced, following the assumptions through the world events of the

thirties, and their reactions in each crisis. Chapter IV will look

for the 1930 assumptions in those who opposed American involvement in

Korea and Vietnam.

The major assumptions employed by isolationists were the belief

in the evils of international involvement and their opposition to

alliances or agreements with any foreign nation that did not involve

American territory or vital interests; that the United States became

involved in war because of a small group of selfish, greedy individuals;

and finally, that the isolationists were convinced that America

required freedom of choice, unilaterialism, in its foreign policy.

Soon after its victory the grand alliance of World War II broke

up, and the world community, calling itself the United Nations, fell

Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 100-105.

67

68

into a pattern of hostility. The world was about to experience periodic

crisis and "limited" war that would characterize the period from 1945

to the present. In the thirty-five year period since World War II,

America has become involved in two limited wars, Korea and Vietnam.

The study of these two engagements will aid in the attempt to determine

if the assumptions of isolationism are still a part of the American

political thought.

There have been other threats to American security, both before

and after, the two police actions mentioned. Russian interference in

the Middle East began early in 1946, in an effort to increase Soviet

influence in Iran and Turkey, The inability of Britain to continue

subsidizing the pro-western factions in the Greek Civil War, and their

inability to afford to modernize the Turkish army, provided further

encouragement for the Russians. The already grave economic situation

that made Britain re-evaluate its support in the Middle East was in­

tensified to near collapse by the winter of 1946-47. The Truman Adminis­

tration was faced with the realization that these two incidents

threatened the balance of power in Europe. In 1947, America was the

only free world power capable of meeting this Soviet challenge.

The United States had no choice but to act in this situation; it

must either take over Britain's responsibilities or lose Greece and

Turkey to the Communists. In response to this crisis, President Truman

went before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, to deliver

a message outlining what would later become known as the Truman

Doctrine, Truman asked for $400 million for economic aid and military

supplies for Greece and Turkey, and stressed the importance of such

69

7 aid if American democracy was to survive.

Close on the heels of the Truman Doctrine came the idea of

economic aid for the rest of Europe, As mentioned above, the

economic chaos in Europe at the time was critical. The plan's purpose

was to help the European nations get back on their feet, so they could

eventually help themselves. Congressional critics of the Marshall

Plan saw nothing but American money poured down a bottomless European

pit. With the development of these two policies, America began the

application of what has been termed the "containment" policy. The

Russian threat to the balance of power in Europe had evoked a counter

response from America, and this policy of countering each Russian

threat would be the key to the containment of the Soviet Union. The

United States would answer each probe that the communists attempted

with a counter policy aimed at neutralizing their influence.

Europe was not alone in being confronted by communist-inspired

problems: there were also two Chinas—Nationalist China and Communist

China. In 1945, Russian troops had entered Korea two days after Japan

surrendered. In an agreement between Russia and the United States,

Korea was temporarily divided at the 38th parallel for the purpose

of disarming the Japanese. America was in charge south of the paral­

lel, and the Soviet army supervised disarmament of the Japanese in

the north. A communist government developed in the north as a result

U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Mar. 1947, 93:1980-1981.

John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973) pp. 41-44; See above, p, 68.

70

of Russian occupation. In Indochina, the French were having difficul­

ty with the continuing progress of the Vietminh. American aid was

sent to South Korea and was considered for the French in Indochina,

but for the time being, direct intervention was ruled out.

By the fall of 1949, Mao Tse-tung had proclaimed the People's

Republic of China, and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists had withdrawn

to the island of Formosa. The fear that all of southeast Asia might

fall under the control of communism was increased even more by this

loss of China. However, the American public was unconvinced, according

to a Gallup poll taken in September, 1949. The pollsters asked

Americans, "Do you think the United States should or should not try to

help Chiang^Kai-shek?" Forty-four per cent answered that Americans

should not, 25 per cent felt America should help, and 31 per cent had

no opinion. The Truman administration announced the end of aid to

Chiang's Nationalist government, but did not officially recognize Red

China.

In a poll conducted a month later the public was given the chance

to answer the question on the recognition of Communist China. Qf

those familiar with the Civil War, only 20 per cent favored recogni­

tion, 42 per cent opposed, and 14 per cent had no opinion. Congres­

sional discontent with the Truman foreign policy was also growing.

Israel, ed,. Major Peace Treaties, pp, 2641-2656; Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 115-119; Spanier, American Policy, p. 85.

John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950), p. 231.

^Gallup, Public Opinion, (Aug. 14, 1949) p. 853.

" Ibid., 1 Nov. 1949, pp. 880-881.

71

Immediately after the Second World War, Republicans had joined with

the administration in a bipartisan foreign policy, but as 1950 began,

the partnership began collapsing. Mainly as a result of Senator

Vandenberg's minority leadership, a period of approximately four years

of bipartisan effort had created a sense of national solidarity.

Critics of this policy in the Republican party had warned, for several

years, that this compromise defeated the purpose of the opposition

party—that of criticism and exposition. The Chinese Nationalist loss

in the civil war brought this partisan friction to its highest pitch g

since 1945.

It was in this spirit of bipartisanship that the Truman Doctrine,

Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Security Pact, later the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, were approved. Spanier comments:

It seems a cruel twist of fate that this very success of American foreign policy in Europe should have brought about a shift of Communist pressure from Europe to Asia— a shift which in June, 1950, led to the outbreak of the Korean War. The Truman Doctrine had prevented a Russian breakthrough in Southeast Europe and the Middle East and established Western Europe's flank in the eastern Mediterrannean. The Marshall Plan had set Europe on the path to economic recovery and health. NATO had guaranteed Europe its security. The lesson of two world wars had been absorbed, and the NATO commitment was the proof of this.^

Public opinion also supported these measures: in March, 1949, 76

per cent of those polled favored NATO, and in another poll in May,

^Ibid., (Nov. 1, 1949) pp. 880-881.

Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism, (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956) pp. 13-14; Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 119; J. William Fullbright, The Crippled Giant, (New York: Random House, 1972) pp. 23-24.

9 Spanier, American Policy, pp. 69-70.

72

67 per cent thought the Senate should ratify the treaty; and in May,

1950, 74 per cent still thought that the Pact was a good idea.-'-

According to Norman Graebner:

. . . the combination of the loss of China to the communist; a failure by the administration to provide positive aid to Chiang; the defeat of the United States at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, had been engineered in the State Department and the foreign service; the Korean War, and Truman's decision to remove General MacArthur; and finally the entry of Red China into the fighting in Korea, all contributed to the loss of bipartisan support and the creation of neo-isolationism.H

The administration's policy toward Korea made that country

dispensable from the standpoint of American security, since in a

global war the nation could be neutralized by air and sea power.

American troops had, with this concept in mind, been withdrawn from

South Korea in 1949. The United States' preoccupation with a global,

all-out war caught this country by surprise when on June 25, 1950,

12 North Korean soldiers attacked the South.

The entire issue of containment was on the line in Korea. The

attack on South Korea illustrates that the Russians did not believe

that the United States would risk massive retaliation to save Korea.

The invasion left Truman but one choice: in light of his containment

policy he must meet force with force. The President then was con­

fronted with the lack of a standing army large enough to fight a

conventional war. After World War II, the cry for rapid demobiliza­

tion and the subsequent policy of global wars, the reguirement for a

- °Gallup, Public Opinion, (Mar. 20, 1949) p. 800; (May 18, 1949) p. 815; (May 1, 1950) p. 912,

Graedner, New Isolationism, pp. 42-55.

12 Spanier, American Policies, pp. 34-86.

73

large army was unnecessary. Consequently, the army had been reduced

to skeleton levels. General MacArthur's small Japanese occupation

forces, sea and air power, and later troops from other countries

under the shield of the United Nations, were committed to aid South

Korea.

Before continuing with the subject of limited wars, a treatment

of how isolationism adapted to the new world conditions, and who

these isolationists were, is necessary.

The isolationism of the fifites still exhibited some of the prejudices of radical nationalism: the deep feelings of mis­trust, suspicion, and withdrawal from the world. This con­tinued with the conviction that America could live in this world without allies, commitments, or military preparedness. These isolationists, like those of the thirties, believed that negotiation which resulted in compromise was identical to appeasem*nt and a sign of weakness.I^

Graebner, in the above statement, is describing a much smaller

group of people in the fifties, compared to those of the thirties.

The thirties group had a larger following in Congress, the press,

and among the public However, World War II had destroyed the

relevancy of isolationism for the vast majority of Americans by

mid-century. In a Gallup poll conducted in March, 1950, in answer

to the question, "What is the most important problem facing Ameri­

cans?", domestic issues were the preoccupation of most. Unemployment,

- - Spanier, American Policies, p. 88; Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 121-122; Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 53-54.

Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 22-23.

74

housing, strikes, economic problems, farm problems, and race problems

were mentioned in their order of frequency.

The traditional isolationist thought was still supported by

the McCormick and Hearst press, and several columnists. Extreme

right organizations, such as Merwin K. Harts National Economic Council,

had opposed the Marshall Plan as the means to finance European

socialism; the United Nations as an octopus that would propel America

toward a "collectivist" world; and NATO because United States involve­

ment meant abandoning traditional foreign policy aimed at avoiding

permanent alliances. The American Coalition of Patriotic Societies,

was a merger of approximately 85 organizations. Some of these groups

were the DAR, American War Mothers, the Dames of the Loyal Legion, and

the Sons of the American Revolution. Led by John B. Trevor, the coali­

tion agreed that the greatest threat to American security was those

"socialist" planners in the federal government. It was those indivi­

duals who must be identified and removed from positions of authority."

Isolationist members in Congress included Senator Robert A. Taft

of Ohio, Senator William Knowland of California, Senator James P. Kem

of Missouri, and Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi. While

there were other supporters in Congress, Taft and Knowland were the

acknowledged leaders of the new opposition. Arthur Schlesinger

maintained:

The queer complex of feeling, fear, and prejudice was too

15 Gallup, Public Opinion, (Mar. 26, 1950) p. 905.

Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 20-22.

75

deep to be repealed in a decade. The emotional core of the new isolationism survived - the hatred of Europe and its age-old troubles; the belief in an American purity which should not risk corruption in contact with outsiders; the agoraphobic fear of a larger world; the old cherished, wistful hope that we could continue to live of ourselves and by ourselves. And underground, these emotions have continued to exercise a paralyzing effect on policy. More than anything else, perhaps, they have kept America a slumbering giant, unable to export its deomcratic faith to the peoples of other nations, unable to play a full and affirmative role in the world.17

Schlesinger may be attributing more power and influence to the new

isolationists than is actually warranted. In this article, Schlesinger

announced the probable end to isolationism, and in the above paragraph

stated, that isolationists " . . . are exercising a paralyzing effect

18 upon policy."

In his book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, Taft suggested four

measures to meet the threat of communism without going to the extreme

costs that Truman's policy called for: (1) the continued use of the

Voice of America for the iron-curtain countries, and the use of local

press and radio facilities in other countries. He also suggested

that the propaganda concern should be moved away from the Department

of State; (2) use the same methods of infiltration that Russia uses

against America; (3) encourage and build-up the support of friendly

nations or neutral countries who believe in liberty and oppose communism;

(4) the elimination from the government of all those who directly or

•'" Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "The New Isolationism." Atlantic, May, 1952, pp. 34-38.

- Ibid., p. 38.

76

19 indirectly are connected with the communist organization. Basically

his major differences with the administration were the staggering

costs of Truman's policies. Taft ended his book with the conclusion:

"In short, a war against communism in the world must finally be won

20 in the minds of men."

Both Schlesinger and Graebner stated that the new isolationists

21 reject the classification of "isolationism." Taft explained:

Our traditional policy of neutrality and non-interference with other nations was based on the principle that this policy was the best way to avoid disputes with other nations and to maintain the liberty of this country with­out war. From the days of George Washington that has been the policy of the United States. It has never been isola­tionism; but it has always avoided alliances and interference in foreign quarrels as a preventative against possible war, and it has always opposed any commitment by the United States, in advance, to take any military action outside of our territory. It would leave us free to interfere or not inter­fere according to whether we consider the case of sufficient­ly vital interest to the liberty of this country. It was the policy of the free hand.22

Taft did admit that he was against the United Nations because

of its failure to keep peace. " . . . because it was organized on

an unsound basis with a veto power in five nations and is based, in

fact, on the joint powers of such nations, effective only so long as

23 they agree." Taft believed that "No nation can be constantly prepared

to undertake a full-scale war at any moment and still hope to maintain

any of the other purposes in which people are interested, and for which

Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, (Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951) p. GG, 117-120.

Ibid., p. 121.

21 Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 24-25; Schlesinger, The New

Isolationism, p. 34, 22 Taft, A Foreign Policy, p, 12.

77

nations are founded," The Congressman from Ohio did not wish to see

the American economy over-burdened by a huge military budget, which

24 he felt, was the direction that the Truman administration was taking.

The reduction in military spending, called for by Taft, evidently

has been a priority of others, as the military budget and personnel

have been reduced after each major crisis. Americans have supported

and sometimes demanded rapid demobilization of the armed forces follow­

ing each conflict since World War I. This reduction to a small,

sometimes too small, force was especially acute prior to World War II

and Korea. Military preparedness for the conflict in Vietnam,

while insufficient, was not as urgent because of the gradual escalation

of the war. However, after the compromise in Korea, military personnel

and budgets were significantly reduced.

Taft suggested that the government should set itself a budget limit

based upon the possible tax revenue it had available. Disagreeing

with those who believed in "fortress America," the Senator stressed

the importance of air and sea power which could provide effective world­

wide defense.^^ Taft admitted that he voted against the Atlantic Pact,

"because it committed this country to the policy of a land war in

Europe." Yet public opinion in May, 1950, approved of the Atlantic Pact

(76 per cent) and thought that the Senate should ratify the treaty.

Therefore, while the Senator objected to American alliances, such as

26 NATO, he was not in step with the majority of the public. Once again.

^^Ibid,, pp. 68-69,

^^Ibid., p, 77.

26 Ibid., p, 89; Gallup, Public Opinion,(May 14, 1950) p. 912.

78

this aversion to commitments and alliances is demonstrated, especially

when they involved Europe, Avoidance of agreements, and the in­

sistence upon retaining a unilateral foreign policy for America, was

reported by Taft,

Taft's views on foreign aid were shared by a few others in

Congress. In January, 1950, while the House was debating a bill that

would provide $150 million in aid to South Korea, Representative John

E. Rankin expressed his thoughts on foreign aid:

You talk about chaos in Korea. If we keep pouring the money of the American taxpayers down the rat holes of Europe, Asia, Israel, Africa, and Japan, how long will it be before we will be in economic chaos?27

Shortly after the debate. President Truman remarked that he was looking

forward to the up-coming Congressional elections, and hoped for a more

internationalist Congress. Senator Knowland addressed his remarks to

the President's earlier statement with:

If it is the intent of the President of the United States to have a rubber stamp Congress, a Congress which will rubber stamp agreements such as those at Yalta and at Potsdam, by which we surrendered the liberty of literally millions in Poland, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, in China, and in North Korea, then I say I do not believe the President will get that type of cooperation from this side of the aisle.28

Two of the three assumptions advocated by isolationists, have

been shown in the discussion so far, as those advocated by Senator

Taft and his followers. The third point, that of a conspiracy of a

small group of individuals, is handled by Graebner through the

accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. According to

77 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 81st Cong.,

2nd sess., 19 Jan. 1950, 96:631-633.

^^Ibid., 13 Apr. 1950, 96:5152.

79

Graebner, McCarthy played upon American fears of communism, and

charged that there were communists working and shaping American

foreign policy inside the State Department.^^ What the motives were

of the Senators who approved of the McCarthy "witch hunt," can only

be guessed at. It does appear that Taft and others of his party

gave at least tacit approval of the investigations conducted by the

McCarthy Committee, and their efforts to purge the federal government

of alleged communist sympathizers.

The opposition to American intervention in Korea was evident in

the press and Congress, although it was never large enough, nor

organized enough, to influence foreign policy to any great extent.

Polls show that Americans were dissatisfied with the Truman administra­

tion, mainly because of political corruption. In the Presidential

election of 1952, General Eisenhower, the Republican candidate,

captured the White House. Despite the rhetoric of the Eisenhower

administration, the policies of the Truman years remained the basis of

American foreign policy for most of the 1950s. Eisenhower appointed

John Foster Dulles to the post of Secretary of State, and Dulles,

always conscious of public opinion and support, supplied the moralistic

rhetoric for the voicing of the administration's foreign policy

. . . 30 decisions.

29 Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 28-30.

^°Stupak, Foreign Policy, pp. 122-127, 138-139; Bartlett, Pax Americana,pp. 127-129; Spanier, American Policy, p. 102; Gallup, Public Opinion, (Oct. 14, 1951) p. 1020, (Jan. 20, 1952), p. 1040, TTune 15, 1952) p. 1071.

80

Eisenhower, early in his first term, announced his policy of

globalism, stating that nations would not be written off only

because they were small or already captive. Since the communist

attack was a global one, then the free world's defense must be global

as well. The administration faced a formidable task in introducing

globalism and the attending expense, while promising to lower taxes

and government spending and balance the budget. Taft and other cost-

conscious Congressmen continually applied pressure on the administra­

tion in the effort toward economy in the military budget. These con­

siderations and pressures forced Eisenhower to reexamine Dulles' theory

of massive retaliation. Thus by upgrading the role of nuclear

weapons, the costs would be less than in maintaining a large conven­

tional force. Spanier had this to say about the Republican campaign

promises;

The Republicans thus appeared not only to promise an eventual end to the Cold War - they also pledged themselves to do it at less cost. For they claimed that the Democrats' foreign policy of indefinite coexistence, with its vast outlay for armaments and economic aid, would undermine the nation's econo­my . . . . The Republicans in brief, promised the nation at one and the same time an offensive strate­gy, a balanced budget, and reduction of taxes. They pledged a rollback of Soviet power on the one hand and, on the other, a cut in the appropriations for America's defense,^2

On April 19, 1953, a poll was conducted and the guestion was

asked: "At present there are about 3.5 million men in our armed

^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 129-134; Stupak, Foreign Policy, p, 126,

32 Spanier, American Policy, p. 103-

81

forces, both in the United States and overseas. If a truce is reached

in Korea, do you think we should cut down on the size of our military

or not?" Seventy-four per cent thought the United States should not

reduce the size of its military, while 22 per cent thought America

should, and 4 per cent had no opinion. However, the administration

did manage to bring the Korean War to an end in 1953 with the perma­

nent separation of Korea at the 38th parallel, the original starting

point just after World War II. The administration also drew a clear

"frontier" line around the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Eisenhower

extended the frontier line, begun by the Democrats from Norway to

Turkey, into the Middle and Far East, The President, with the deter­

rent power of the Strategic Air Command, believed that the free world

could preserve this global boundary around the communist world.

President Eisenhower had proclaimed that if Indochina should fall,

the loss would be an important threat to American security. With this

thought in mind, the administration began supplying France with economic

and military aid. Just prior to the French defeat at Dienbienphu, the

United States was providing over 75 per cent of the cost of the war.

The French, after Dienbienphu, agreed to end the war, and on July

20, 1954, an armistice agreement was reached that divided the country

^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (19 Apr, 1953) p. 1140.

Israel, ed.. Major Peace Treaties, pp. 2657-2688; Spanier, American Policy, p. 105.

^^Ibid,, pp, 106-110; Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 132-133; Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, (New York; Columbia University Press, 1967) pp, 24-25,

82

at the 17th parallel. The communists then were in complete control of

north Indochina, and it seemed only a matter of time until they would

take over the southern government of Ngo Dinh Diem. In addition to

extending aid to Diem, the administration also included Vietnam,

Cambodia, and Lao under the protection of the Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty.

In Congress a number of Senators and Representatives took a firm

stand against unilateral intervention in South Vietnam. Public opinion

was also against American involvement in Indochina. In a poll taken,

even before the fall of Dienbienphu, 85 per cent disapproved of sending

American troops to help the French, while only 8 per cent approved of

such action. For the time being, since Congress, the public,

America's allies, and Eisenhower himself, were opposed to intervention;

38 economic and military aid would have to suffice.

Eisenhower was destined to have other critical situations arise

during the remainder of his Presidency. In the summer of 1954, a crisis

developed over the Communist Chinese shelling of the Nationalists'

islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of China. In 1956,

trouble developed between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal, and

shortly afterward the Israel-Egypt war was precipitated. In the summer

of 1958, a group of nationalist officers successfully seized thegovern-

^^Spanier, American Policy, pp. 111-113; Bartlett, Pax Americana, p. 130; Gurtov, First Vietnam, pp. 134-145; Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, (New York: The Viking Press, 1967) pp. 146-148.

^^Gallup, Public Opinion, (15 Aug. 1953) p. A1185-

^^Gurtov, First Vietnam, pp. 145-147.

83

ment of Iraq. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Jordan, threatened by revo­

lution, asked for military support. Britain and American troops

39 were sent to the two countries to help stabilize the situations.

President Kennedy, who took office in January, 1961, inherited

a plan from the Eisenhower administration to attempt an overthrow of

Fidel Castro in Cuba. The exercise, using Cuban exiles, failed through

poor planning and the lack of support, and later became known as the

"Bay of Pigs fiasco." The recurrent crisis in West Berlin continued

to plague America from 1958 to 1962. In late 1962, United States

intelligence suddenly discovered that the Russians were building

launching sites for missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev, emboldened by

America's previous failures to use force, apparently believed that he

held another winning hand. In a confrontation between Kennedy and the

Soviet leader, Khrushchev finally backed down.

Kennedy, in the early 1950s, had been a critic of American inter­

vention in Indochina, but by the mid-1950s he thought that Vietnam

might have a chance under the leadership of Diem. However, by 1963,

Buddist discontent broke out in a dispute nearing civil war, and in

November, Diem was assassinated by his own army. President Kennedy

preferred to use military advisors, rather than combat troops, to

ensure that the South Vietnames should fight their own war. Even

^^Spanier, American Policy, pp. 113-127; Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 137-142.

^°Ibid., pp. 129-134; pp. 149-153.

84

with Kennedy's caution, the American commitment and involvement in

the war steadily increased. This momentum, once begun, was difficult

to slow down, and after Kennedy's assassination in 1963, President

Johnson increased America's role in Vietnam.

In August, 1964, the Johnson administration used the clash

between North Vietnamese and American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin

to gain discretionary war powers from Congress. The year, 1965,

witnessed an ever increasing number of American troops commited to

Vietnam and an escalation in the bombing of the Vietcong and North

Vietnam. The same year, the first protests against the Asian war

began in the universities. J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, became one of the most distinguished

critics of administration policies. Public opinion was lagging behind

this criticism, still favoring the Johnson policies in Vietnam by

almost a two-to-one margin. After 1965, because of public opinion

and the increased war protests, the Johnson administration attempted

to conceal facts relating to the military situation in Vietnam and

42 the degree of American participation.

The Communist Tet offensive of February, 1968, was the beginning

of the end for Johnson's hopes and policies. Public opinion made it

difficult for the President to seek another term in the White House.

The disengagement from Vietnam was left to the incoming President,

Richard M. Nixon. The new President, after initially escallating the

Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 134-159.

• Ibid., pp. 139-160; Gallup, Public Opinion , (14 Oct. 1967) p. 1618

85

war, finally decided upon the policy of gradual Vietnamization. A

plan to train and equip South Vietnamese troops to replace American

combat forces was developed.

One additional point needs consideration before concluding the

Vietnam conflict. The assumption was that there existed a small group

of individuals who profit from war. During Vietnam, that charge was

made against the military-industrial complex who were aided by a few

influencial congressmen. The thirties group of isolationists saw

the arms manufacturers as those who directly benefit from war, and

in the sixties the military establishment was added to the war indus­

tries as a powerful coalition that decided the foreign policies under

44 which America operated.

Negotiations between the United States and Hanoi were finally

concluded in January, 1973, after North Vietnam agreed to allow the

Southern government to continue. As the last Americans were leaving

45 Vietnam, communist troops were attacking Saigon. Americans have

alternated between the extremes of isolationism and internationalism

since the birth of this nation without producing a satisfactory solu­

tion to the problem of a consistent foreign policy. The threads of

Washington's Farewell Address seem to linger on in the American political

^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp, 167-169; Spanier,. American Policy, p. 252.

Spanier, American Policy, p. 277,

"^^Bartlett, Pax Americana, pp. 170-171; Spanier, American Policy, pp. 255-261.

86

system.

As previously discussed in the text, revisionist historians have

re-evaluated America's role in the conflict after every major war.

These revisionists have followed certain themes: (1) the conflicts in

which the nation became involved in, did not in fact, threaten United

States security; (2) the United States became entangled in war

because the politicians saw a menace where none existed, and this

illusion had been touted by propagandists who manipulated public opi­

nion, by soldiers with bureaucratic motives, and by bankers and indus­

trialists in the 1930s; the communist sympathizers in government

service during the 1950s; and the "military-industrial complex" of

the 1960s—whose interests benefited from the conflict.

American involvement in both world wars as well as the two limited

conflicts that followed, so the revisionist argument goes, were mis­

calculations that were unnecessary or immoral, or both. The revi­

sionists contend that the real enemy, did not in actual fact, represent

a threat to American security at all. Conversely, they believed the

threat turns out to be from within America's own system rather than

from any outside aggressor.

This school of revisionists also contend that President Truman

and a band of "cold warriors," led by Dean Acheson, were responsible

for the Cold War that precipitated Korea and Vietnam. They charged

Stupak, Foreign Policy, pp. 87-89; Spanier, American Policy, pp, 20-21.

47 Ibid., pp. 87-89; pp. 20-21.

87

Truman with deliberately sabotaging Yalta and creating a violently

anti-communistic United States because of pressures from the military-

industrial complex, and a national anti-communist neurosis. The

United States was also charged as having failed to accurately assess

Soviet military capabilities and intentions." ^

Before concluding this chapter a review of the antiwar movement

is necessary to determine if it conforms to the isolationist assump­

tions. In the late 1950s and early 1960s college students across the

nation became aware of and joined in the civil rights struggle. As

the number of students participating in the civil rights movement

increased, so too did their awareness that their own freedom to engage

in these activities was limited by college policy. This latter dis­

covery created the struggle for student academic freedom with a

49 special emphasis on civil rights.

In a study by E.G. Williamson and John L. Cowan, conducted in

1963-64, the authors found evidence that on a few campuses students

initially became concerned with their own freedom, and later became

involved with the civil rights issue. Whatever the historical rela­

tionship between the two movements, the authors believe that their

study clearly show that students were concerned with both issues.

Student protest in America has not been confined to this period as

^^Ibid., pp. 87-89; pp. 20-21,

49 E,G, Williamson and John L. Cowan, The American Student's

Freedom of Expression, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1966), pp. v-viii, 103-195; James Wechsler, Revolt on the Campus, (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1973) , pp. v-x.

Ibid., pp. 103-105; p. v.

88

there have been other organizations on university campuses both

before and after.

The reason for examining the 1920-1970 period is in order to

compare and contrast the student anti-war activities to the previous­

ly discussed isolationist movement. Student activism in America has

generally been confined to the events mirrored in the larger society.

The student movement of the twenties and thirties was mainly con­

cerned with the problems of peace and war with a strong undercurrent

of radical politics.

American student activism has had a long history, but not until

the 1960s, with its coverage by the mass media, has there been any

extensive analysis of the anti-war movement. In May, 1971 The Annals

of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted one

52 volume to the subject of "Student Protest." The special editors of

this volume, Philip G. Altbach and Robert S. Laufer, believe that the

history of student protest demonstrate the continuity of issues in

each phase of the student movement from 1920-1960. These issues are

primarily civil rights, civil liberties, war and disarmament. Of

course, interest here is confined to the American student movement in

light of its relationship, if any, to the isolationist assumptions

Williamson and Cowan, American Students, pp. 39-40; Irwin Unger, The Movement. (New York: New York University, 1974), p. vi; Philip G. Altbach and Patti Peterson, "Before Berkeley: Historical Perspectives on American Student Activism," The Annals, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 395 , May 1971, pp. 1-14.

^^Lambert, Richard D., ed.. The Annals. Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1971.

Ibid., pp. ix-xiii.

89

established earlier in this paper. The following then is a brief,

historical observation of the phases of student activism from the

1920 organizations and their goals to the greater publicized groups

in the 1960s.

In the 1920s a number of groups were formed which strongly

favored the League of Nations and world disarmament. The National

Student Committee for the Limitation of Armaments (NSCLA), was active

in supplying anti-war speakers for other colleges. In 1922 it merged

with the Intercollege Liberal League (ILL), to form the National

Student Forum (NSF). Emerging also during this period were organi­

zations such as, the National Student Federation of America (NSFA),

and the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). The NSFA,

founded in 1925 was the forerunner of the present-day National

Student Association (NSA), and was primarily interested in interna­

tional cooperation and understanding among student groups. The SLID

actively campaigned against ROTC and American involvement in

Nicaragua and Mexico.

The 1930s witnessed the growth of a mass student movement within

the United States. Altbach and Peterson emphasize that those "poli­

tically active" students were generally affiliated with adult politi­

cal groups and usually took their cues from the adult movement. The

Edward Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin Williams, Jr., "Attitudes Toward the Korean War," Public Opinion Quarterly, 17 (Spring 1953) pp. 173, 182.

90

authors state that " . . . even the antiwar movement was stimulated as

much by conservative isolationists as by radical students."^^ The

radical group they were referring to was the emergence of the left-wing

campus groups of the Socialist and Communist parties. In 1931, the

National Student League (N5L), was formed under Communist support and

eventual domination. NSL and SLID worked together in organizing anti­

war campaigns on campus and in the American Student Union (ASU), in

^^^1-^2. The anti-war issue was the most volatile question on Ameri­

can campuses during the 1930s. The American Student Union, basically

a union of the Communist NSL and the Socialist SLID, plus other un­

affiliated liberals, functioned between 1935 and 1939. National

student peace strikes were organized between 1935 and 1939 and at­

tracted the public attention.

The movement of the thirties involved large numbers of students

in impressive demonstrations but they failed to sustain any viable

movement. The factional politics of the Left provided little appeal

for many students who were more interested in campus issues. With

the advent of World War II, the American student movement simply col­

lapsed. The forties and the early fifties are in stark contrast with

the previous active movement. In 1943, the American Youth for

Democracy (AYD), composed of Communist activists, was organized. The

United World Federalists (UWF), formation was brief, urging Americans

Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley," pp. 4-5.

^^Ibid., pp. 6-8; Philip G. Altbach, Student Politics in America, f^ ujstorical Analysis. (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974) pp'. 92-93.

91

to give up their national sovereignty in favor of world government.

The Students for Democratic Action (SDA), founded in 1947, was affi­

liated with the liberal anti-Communist Americans for Democratic

Action (ADA). The development of the Cold War, the Korean War, the

Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, and the increasingly anti-

Communist stance of the United States government, combined to make

57 radical and liberal student organizations unpopular. One major

national student organization founded in 1948, was the National

Student Association, which early declared itself anti-Communist.

Although a large organization, the NSA made little impact on its

student members.

The Students for Democratic Action (SDA), also founded in 1948,

was a liberal political organization whose members were violently

anti-Communist. A small national organization, the SDA was dependent

upon its parent group, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), for

its financial support and guidance until its merger with the ADA in

1959. The SDA favored a strong United Nations and a strong American

military. It opposed universal military training, which was suggested »

at the time as an alternative to the Selective Service System, The

group also involved itself with civil liberties and civil rights

58 issues on the campus, Altbach views the fifties as a transitional

^^Ibid,, pp, 8-9.

eg Altbach, Student Politics, pp. 132-138.

92

period for campus activity:

With the early part of the decade resembling the thirties in terms of organizational forms of political concerns, and the latter marking a change in campus radicalism and a move toward both the styles and issues of the New Left. The late fifties saw a re­surgence of campus social concern, which paved the way for the more active sixties.^^

A poll taken in 1953 indicated that 36 percent of students had

strong reservations and 26 percent were strongly opposed to the war,

yet no group took advantage of these feelings to mobilize the

students. Despite the repression of the Cold War and McCarthyism,

left-wing student groups managed to survive the fifties, preserving

the radical thought for the next decade.

In the early fifties radical student groups were able to

continue operating within the framework of the other student groups.

During the era of McCarthyism radical activity was literally brought

to a standstill. The end of the Korean War and the easing of tensions

along with a greater degree of tolerance in the United States made

political activism a little easier and more popular.

The peace movement, which had been dormant in the late forties

and early fifties, was revived through two groups. The Fellowship of

59 Ibid., p. 141; Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley,"

The Annals, pp. 10-11; Unger, The Movement, pp. 10-16; James P. O'Brien, "The Development of the New Left," The Annals, 395, May 1971, pp. 15-18.

Edward Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin Williams, Jr., "Attitudes Toward the Korean War," Public Opinion Quarterly 17 (Spring 1953) pp. 173, 182.

Altbach and Peterson, "Before Berkeley," The Annals, p. 10; Altbach, Student Politics, pp. 142-144, 174.

93

Reconciliation (FOR), and the American Friends Service Committee

(AFSC), who in cooperation with socialist and religious groups,

began speaking and staging periodic demonstrations against war in the

mid-fifties. These two groups were pacifists in ideology, and dealt

mainly with the fears associated with nuclear weapons. In 1957, the

National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), formed a student

affiliate. The Student Peace Union (SPU), which operated as a formi­

dable campus force between 1959 to 1963, was organized largely by

socialist students. The student SANE, composed of radicals and

liberals lost most of its effectiveness by 1960 because of clashes

62 with the more conservative parent group.

Another radical peace group which organized in 1959 was the

Student Peace Union (SPU), placed special emphasis on the futility

of war. The College Peace Union (CPU), also founded in 1959, merged

with the SPU in 1960. The SPU, while being actively supported by the

FOR and AFSC groups, retained much of its autonomy because it had no

parent organization which could dictate policy. Primarily the SPU

was concerned with the dangers of nuclear war and criticized both the

Soviet Union: and the United States for the Cold War and the arms

63 race.

In 1961, the SPU sponsored the Washington Action Project, a

demonstration against atmospheric nuclear testing, and were actively

^^Unger, The Movement, p. 13; Altbach, Student Politics, pp. 182-183.

^^Altbach, Student Politics, pp, 186-190.

94

engaged in the civil rights movement. Originally the SPU boasted a

large membership, but as the sixties continued and the issues changed,

this group, unwilling to change its ideological position, gradually

lost its appeal to the students. Civil rights and freedoms remained

the dominant issues through 1965- Two groups took over the leadership

from the peace movement in the early sixties. The Student Non­

violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Students for a Demo­

cratic Society (SDS), provided guidance for the civil rights and the

anti-war movements. Organized in 1960 by black and white students,

the SNCC helped organize sit-ins and freedom rides to dramatize the

effects of segregation. SDS was comprised of socialists, liberals,

and radicals. Originally SDS Was liberal in philosophy, but by mid-64

1962, it began a drift to the Left.

By 1965, student activists began paying closer attention to

America's increased involvement in Vietnam. In the same year the

civil rights movement was taken over by black militants and groups

such as SDS turned leftward to neo-Marxist ideas and the New Left

movement. Sit-ins, teach-ins, and anti-draft registration protests

became the standard methods of protest. As the war in Vietnam

escalated, the tactics of the anti-war movement also increased in

its radicalization. Campus unrest and take-overs began at Berkeley,

Columbia, Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, and other

Unger, The Movement, pp. 52-53, 57-64; Altbach, Student Politics, p. 155; O'Brien, "The Development," The Annals, pp. 20-21.

65 Unger, The Movement, pp. 97-9.8.

95

universities across the nation. The movement took on an anti-war,

anti-establishment flavor and its leaders were young middleclass,

well-educated students. Other radical groups were formed during the

sixties, such as the Movement for a Democratic Society (MDS),

Radicals in the Professions (RP), and several other groups who were

unsuccessful in their efforts. A more successful group was the New

University Conference (NUC), founded in Chicago in 1968. This group's

focus was on faculty and graduate students' concerns.

The anti-war protest of the sixties appears to be ideologically

different from the major isolationist group of the 1930s. This dif­

ference is similar to the group discussed in Chapter II, under the

category of radical isolationists. The 1960 left-wing movement was

interested in foreign agreements and alliances, but from the stand­

point of civil rights, civil freedom issues rather than the motiva­

tions of the earlier group, who required American interests and

68 territory as the major factor.

The anti-war protestors were advocates of the second assumption

that blamed the military-industrial complex for our involvement in

Vietnam. Their major targets, after 1965, were protests against the;

R.O,T,C, on campus; military system in general, especially the

draft; any of the war supply producers; and the military research

programs on campus. Therefore the evidence available does indicate

^^Ibid,, pp. 103-105; O'Brien, "The Development," The Annals, p, 24,

67 Ibid., p, 24,

68 For a more detailed discussion of this matter see p. 23 above.

96

that the 1960 anti-war movement ascribed to this isolationist

. . 69 assumption.

The third assumption, the demand for a unilateral foreign policy,

is more difficult to assign to the anti-war movement. Their emphasis is

upon civil rights and civil freedom, and consequently this might bind

the movement to this assumption. Unfortunately the available evidence

is not strong enough to support this contention.

The student movement of the sixties and early seventies had some

impact upon the general society, but the society at large remained

stable and mainly unaffected by the student protests. The activity

on campus was performed and led by a very small minority of students

who did shape the orientation of the universities. The protest move­

ment involved mainly civil rights and freedoms, and anti-war protest.

It is curious, that while there were some protests on the campus

against Korea, the intensity of that protest was slight in comparison

with that against the Vietnam conflict. Perhaps it was the result

of the intensive media coverage during the Vietnam war that made the

difference, yet. the latter anti-war protest was more pro­

nounced than during Korea. Samuel Lubell, in a study of opinion

over several years in the 1960s, concluded that the draft was the

single largest cause of family concern and protest in 1967. What­

ever the attendent reasons, popular criticism of the Vietnam conflict

continued to build.

^^Ibid., p. 91 above.

Samuel Lubell, Hidden Crisis in American Politics, (New \ork W.W. Norton, 1970) Chapters 6 and 8.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The debate over the direction of American foreign policy has

been a source of conflict since the birth of this nation. Primarily

this debate has been conducted between the two extremes of isola­

tionism and internationalism. Isolationism suggests that American

foreign policy be based upon the doctrine of unilateralism. That

is, America should remain unencumbered from agreements and alliances

with foreign nations. This nation should be free to decide its

foreign policy based upon that which is in the best interests of

the United States. There has been no intent, in this paper, to

argue with the merits or the deficiencies of this movement. It is

instead, to determine if, and the extent to which,these three basic

assumptions of the 1930 isolationists are still accepted by some

Americans.

The first of these assumptions is the isolationists' opposition

to alliances and agreements with foreign nations. This opposition

was greatest when individuals and groups believed that an agreement

did not involve American territory or vital interests. This was the

case after World War II with Congressional opposition to American

membership in the League of Nations and later the World Court. Those

opposed to these two world bodies felt that American interests were

not in accord with the League's Covenant and the jurisdiction of

97

98

the World Court. The 1930 Isolationists were disillusioned with the

power politics employed by the victors of World War I, and believed

that America might be pulled into the characteristic European jealou­

sies and wars.

The 1930 isolationists believed in the need to avoid European

involvement so strongly, that members of Congress attempted to legis­

late American neutrality. The Isolationist coalition was composed of

five basic groups, each with differing ideologies, but all of them

were firmly against American involvement in another war. In the

late 1930s, these groups combined behind the promise of the Neutrality

Act, and fought the Roosevelt administration as the United States

2 moved closer to World War II.

After the Second World War, Congress lost the majority of

its isolationist leaders, either through death or attrition. Senator

Taft retained his seat in Congress, and the conservative isolationist

sentiments of the 1930s remained alive. Taft was able to establish

a small following in Congress, but the stronger, more belligerent

group was gone. Post-war isolationist strength in Congress was in­

sufficient to prevent the passage of foreign agreements presented

by the Truman administration. Taft's group voted against such pro­

posals as: American membership in the United Nations; the Marshall

Plan; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The

American public agreed with the Truman administration that these

For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 18-20 above.

2 Ibid., pp. 18-66 above.

99

agreements were in the best interests of the United States.^

One of Taft's followers. Senator William Knowland, while opposed

to the majority of Truman's policies, was convinced that the health

of Europe, the United Nations, and NATO were in the best interests

of American security, and therefore voted for these agreements:

I will say that I supported the United Nations, I supported the North Atlantic Pact, I supported the arms implementation bill, I supported the Marshall Plan and EGA, and I defy the Senator from Texas to point out a time during the five years I have been a member of the Senate of the United States, since I came back from overseas, when I have not recognized the fact that we live in the age of the airplane and the atom, and that we can no more return to isolation than an adult can return to childhood,^

Ronald Steel explains some of the changes that had occurred in the

"neo-isolationists" thought since World War II:

These neo-isolationists do not want to turn the clock back to 1938 and retire to Fortress America while the rest of the world goes up in flames. These neo-isolationists are, for the most part, convinced internationalists, supporters of foreign aid, NATO, and the Alliance of Progress. What they seek is not a denial of American responsibility but a retrenchment of American commitments to those areas which they consider vital to the national interest; more specifically Western Europe and the western hemisphere. They believe that American military power should be used only to defend the vital strategic interests of the United States, and not to save non-communist governments in Asia and Africa,^

Ibid,, pp, 75-76 above,

U,S, Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Cong,, 2nd sess., 26 June 1950, 96:9159,

Steel, Pax Americana, p. 313.

100

Thus, it can be seen, that the new isolationism has changed

from being anti-Europe (Knowland and Fulbright appear to be good

examples of this change), into an anti-Asia/Africa bias referred to

by Steel. Another difference between the 1930 group and the later

groups can be seen in the 1930 idea of American insularity because

of a geographic isolation from Europe and Asia. To the neo-

isolationists, such as Knowland, the idea of geographic isolation

was no longer viable or realistic. Additionally, neo-isolationists

rejected the concept of Fortress America, realizing that the interests

of American security sometimes exist outside of the United States.

The post-war technological changes and improvements in communi­

cation, transportation, munitions, and the onset of the Cold War

completely destroyed any suggestion of American geographic insulation.

America had turned away from isolationism to the concepts of

globalism, massive retaliation, and containment of the Communist world

In the 1950s, the McCarthy era repression made dissent during

the Korean War difficult and costly. Still, the war had its oppo­

nents. The general public found it difficult to understand why

America was involved in an Asian country that the administration had

previously considered expendable. The Taftites in Congress were

concerned about the cost of the war and how it detracted from the

more important domestic issues; in other words America was fighting

in a country that was devoid of vital interests to this nation.

For a more detailed discussion of this matter see p. 99 above

101

Although Taft was very vocal in his opposition, his group lacked

sufficient strength to influence American foreign policy. After

Taft's death in 1953, the "movement" lost its major spokesman.

While there are examples of opposition to the administration's

foreign policy after Taft's death, evidence of isolationist sentiment

is not apparent. Anti-war sentiment was in evidence during the Korean

War, but it was confined to the larger universities, and was mild in

comparison to the protests of the sixties. There was a resurgence

of the peace movement in the late-fifties against war and nuclear

weapons, but there is little evidence to connect these groups to the

first isolationist assumption. Until the end of the fifties,

liberals and radicals were not outspoken, preferring to work quietly

7 within the peace movement.

The protests of the sixties, as mentioned earlier, rested

primarily upon three major issues: civil rights, civil freedom,

and anti-war activities. The student movement, including the New

Left, were occupied with the first two causes until 1965, when their

interest turned to the escalating war in Vietnam. Their opposition

appears to be aimed at the government in general, and its use of

the war, rather than to any specific agreements this country might

have made with Vietnam. The major target of these protests were

the draft system; the military, especially the presence of the

ROTC groups on campus; and President Johnson and his administration.

For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 75-76 above

102

There is some evidence that would link this movement to the first g

isolationists' assumption.

The conspiracy theory supported by the revisionist historians

is the second isolationist assumption to be measured. The belief

that the cause of American involvement in war is determined by a

small group of individuals, intent upon profiting by the war. This

second assumption was frequently used by the 1930 group to explain

the cause of World War I, and provided the reason to avoid making

the same mistake in the 1930s. This fear prompted the Nye Committee

investigations of the arms industry in the early thirties. This in­

vestigation and the revisionist articles all suggested that the arms

manufacturers were guilty of a huge conspiracy to instigate and

extend wars. All of the 1930 group of isolationists publicly

subscribed to this theory. This kind of feeling resulted in the

arms embargo and the neutrality legislation passed by Congress during

the thirties. Their justification for limiting arms was that if the

9 profits of war could be limited, then the war might also be avoided.

In the fifties, there is also evidence of the conspiracy theory,

but here the major culprit is viewed as the "socialist planner,"

and communist sympathizers in the federal government. The National

Economic Council and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies,

both extreme right organizations, agreed with this idea.

^For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 87-90 above

^Ibid., pp. 51-56, 84 above.

lOlbid,, p. 74 above.

103

Taft and his followers demanded that all those directly or indirectly

connected with the communist organization be removed from government.

This kind of thinking inspired the McCarthy era, providing a period

of repression, especially for liberal and radical individuals and

groups.

In the late fifties, through the sixties, and into the early

seventies, the guilty parties in the "war conspiracy," changed again.

During this period, the military-industrial complex became the culprit.

The military instigated war because that was their livelihood, and

the industrial complex did so because of profits. Vietnam, so the

argument goes, was the result of a conspiracy between the elites of

the military-industrial complex in their efforts to influence American

foreign policy. Pacifist organizations actively engaged in demonstra­

tions against the military and the manufacturers of nuclear weapons

throughout this period. The Student Peace Union (SPU), the College

Peace Union (CPU), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and the

American Friends. Service Committee (AFSC), were actively engaged in

12 protests against nuclear war and nuclear weapons during the sixties.

Therefore, the evidence indicates that some of the anti-war groups

of the sixties believed in the conspiracy theory.

The third, and final assumption of 1930 isolationist thought,

is the desire to retain America's freedom of choice in foreign

For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp.75-76 above

^^Ibid., pp. 93-94 above.

104

policy decisions. The doctrine of unilateralism would insure that

America would not be confined in its foreign policy decisions by a

prior commitment to another nation. The thirties group was worried

about the Roosevelt administration allying its foreign policy with

the needs and requirements of Europe. They believed this was to the

detriment of the United States. They fought Roosevelt's every move

to aid Britain, France, and later the Soviet Union with money and

material, which they felt should be used to build up America's defense

first. The policy of helping Europe in its war with Germany, would

out of necessity, restrict the President's foreign policy decisions.

The lessons learned from the First World War, with its secret

agreements and power politics might happen again if FDR did not change

his priorities. Likewise the arms embargo and isolationist opposition

to "lend lease," were examples of their demand for unilateralism.

In the fifties, Taftites continued to oppose foreign aid for

Europe and Asia. Taft believed that these argreements and commit­

ments were not of vital interest to American security, and would

limit this country's freedom of choice in its foreign policy decisions.

Peace groups were also concerned, because the greater the number of

agreements made with other nations, the greater the chance of war.

Evidence does not support the contention that the peace organizations

advocated a unilateral policy, since their primary concern was with

For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 44-47 above.

105

war and nuclear weapons.

There is little evidence to demonstrate that the student move­

ment of the sixties was, or was not, interested in the United States

maintaining its freedom of choice in foreign policy. There is evi­

dence that they were dissatisfied with all of the administration's

policies dealing with the Vietnam conflict. As mentioned earlier,

the anti-war movement was aimed at the government in general, and

the military-industrial complex, in particular.

Of the three isolationist assumptions only one appears to

carry-over, to any great degree, into the Korean and Vietnam periods.

The conspiracy theory is evidenced in all groups and the general

public, albeit with some differences.

The first assumption, dealing with the opposition to alliances

and agreements with foreign nations, also appears in the Korean era

group, but after this period the opposition to agreements appear to

be in the form of opposition-party differences. Likewise the third

assumption, that of unilateralism, is not supported beyond the Korean

period.

It is possible that the main tenets of isolationism were only the

products of the generation of the 1930s, and as soon as those indi­

viduals left the scene, the ideas associated with their cause lost

its appeal. It is possible that the assumptions were all proven

unrealistic by the changing technology, and a steadily shrinking world.

14 For a more detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 89-91 above.

106

It is also possible that these views were shared only by a minority

of congressmen in key positions, and condoned by the majority of

Americans. It will depend upon future events and additional study

to determine if this phenomenon will occur again under similar circum­

stances.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse. New York: The Free Press, 1957:

The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1965

Altbach, Philip G. Student Politics in America: A Historical Analy­sis, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974.

Baker, Ray Stafford and Dodd, William E. The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 6 vols. New York and London: Harper, 1926,

Bartlett, C, J. The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974. ,

Beard, Charles A. The Devil Theory of War. New York: Vanguard Press, 1936.

Belmont, Perry. National Isolation an Illusion. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.

Buell, Raymond Leslie. Isolated America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940.

Challenger, Richard D. ed. From Isolation to Containment, 1921-1952. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.

Chatfield, Charles. For Peace and Justice. Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 1971.

Cole, Wayne S. America First. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953.

C.A, Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II. New York: Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich, 1974.

Senator Gerald P, Nye and American Foreign Relations, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.

107

DeConde, Alexander, ed. Isolation and Security. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957.

Divine, Robert A. Causes and Consequences of World War II. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969.

• The Illusion of Neutrality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into WW II.

108

New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965.

Dreiser, Theodore. America is Worth Saving. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941.

Drummond, Donald. The Passing of American Neutrality. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1955.

Dulles, Allen W. and Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. Can We Be Neutral? New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936.

Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1950.

Fay, Sidney B. The Origins of the World War. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1928.

Fehrenbach, T.R. FDR's Undeclared War, 1939-1941. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967.

Foley, Hamilton. Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations. Port Washington, New York; Kennikat Press, Inc., 1923.

Fulbright, J. William. The Crippled Giant. New York: Random House, 1972.

Gallup, George H. Public Opinion, 1935-1971. 6 vols. New York; Random House, 1972.

Gilbert, Felix. To the Farewell Address. Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Goldwater, Barry. The Conscience of a Majority. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Graebner, Norman A. Cold War Diplomacy. New York; D. Van Nostrand

Company, Inc., 1977.

. The New Isolationism. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956.

Gurtov, Melvin. The First Vietnam Crisis. New York; Columbia University Press, 1967.

109

Johnson, Walter. The Battle Against Isolation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

Jonas, Manfred. Isolationism in America; 1935-1941. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Kennedy, S.M. The Monroe Doctrine Clause of the League of Nations Covenant. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1979.

Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.

Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel. The Limits of Power. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.

Langer, William L. and Gleason, S. Everett. The Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1952.

Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963-

Lippman, Walter. Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1952.

Loewenheim, Francis L., Langley, Harold D., and Jonas, Manfred, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975.

Lubell, Samuel. Hidden Crisis in American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 1970.

Morganthau, Hans J. A New Foreign Policy for the United States. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald Bruce, eds. National Party Plat­forms: 1840-1956. Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1956.

Reischauer, Edwin 0. Beyond Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

Russett, Bruce M. No Clear and Present Danger. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.

Schapiro, J. Salwyn. The World in Crisis. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Bitter Heritage. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. 2 vols. New York; Harper & Brothers, 1948.

110

Spanier, John. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

Steel, Ronald. Pax Americana. New York: The Viking Press, 1967.

Stimson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Stupak, Ronald J. American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976.

Swope, George S. Dissent - The Dynamic of Democracy. New York: Amacom, a Division of American Management Association, 1972.

Taft, Robert A. A Foreign Policy for Americans. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951.

Tansill, Charles C. Back Door to War. Chicago; H. Regnery Co., 1952.

Unger, Irwin. The Movement: A History of the American New Left, 1959-1972. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1974.

Wittner, Lawrence S. Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

Articles

Adler, Selig. "Isolation Since 1914." American Scholar. XXI, (Summer 1952) pp. 335-344.

"American Isolation is a Historical Fiction." Saturday Evening Post. 223 (14 Apr. 1951) p. 10-

"America Needs a New Policy." Christian Century. 71 (May 1954) p. 571.

Aron, Raymond, "Is Isolation Possible?" Commentary. 57 (Apr. 1974) pp. 41-46.

"Backsliding to Isolationism?" Catholic World. CLXIII (July 1946) p. 297.

Baruch, Bernard M. "Cash and Carry." Today. V (2 Nov. 1935) pp. 6-7.

. "Neutrality and Common Sense-" Atlantic Monthly. CLIX (Mar. 1937) pp. 368-372.

Beard, Charles A. "Keeping America Out of War." Current History. XLIII (Dec. 1935) pp. 290-292.

Ill

onism." Billington, Ray A. "The Origins of Middle-Western Isolati......... Political Science Quarterly. LX (Mar. 1945) pp. 44-46.

Borah, William E. "Preserving Neutrality." U.S. News. VII (Sept. 1939) p. 11.

Borchard, Edwin M. "Neutrality." Southern Review. II (Autumn 1936) pp. 238-259. "

Borg, Dorothy. "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech." Political Science Quarterly. LXXII (Sept. 1957) pp. 405-433.

Brown, Phillip M. "American Aloofness." Weekly Review. Ill (13 Oct. 1920) pp. 312-313.

Cantril, Hadley. "America Faces the War: A Study in Public Opinion." Public Opinion Quarterly. IV (July 1940) pp. 387-407.

> et al. "America Faces the War: Shifts in Opinion." Public Opinion Quarterly. IV (Oct. 1940) pp. 650-656.

Churchill, Winston. "Do Not Let America Go Isolationist." Time. 64 (18 Oct. 1954) p. 25.

Clark, Bennett C. "Detour Around War." Harper's Magazine. CLXXII (Dec. 1935) pp. 1-9.

. "Neutrality - What Kind?" Vital Speeches of the Day. Ill (Feb. 1937) pp. 252-253.

Cole, Wayne S. "America First and the South, 1940-1941." Journal of Southern History. XXII (Feb. 1956) pp. 36-47.

. "Senator Key Pittman and American Neutrality Policies, 1939-1940," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (Mar. 1960) pp, 644-662.

*

De Conde, Alexander. "The South and Isolationism." Journal of Southern History. XXIV (Aug. 1958) pp. 332-346.

Detzer, Dorothy. "What Neutrality Means." Nation. CXLI (Dec. 1935) pp. 642-643.

Donovan, John C. "Congressional Isolationists and the Roosevelt Foreign Policy." World Politics. Ill (Apr. 1951) pp. 299-316,

Dulles, Allen W. "The Cost of Peace." Foreign Affairs. XII (July 1934) pp. 567-578.

Fay, Sidney B. "New Light on the Origins of the World War." American Historical Review. XXV (July 1920) pp. 616-639; XXVI (Oct. 1920) pp. 37-53; XXVI (Jan. 1921) pp. 225-254.

112

Flynn, John T. "United States Neutrality." Common Sense. VI (Oct. 1937) pp. 8-10.

Graber, Doris A. "The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines in the Light of the Doctrine of Non-intervention." Political Science Quarterly. LXXIII (July 1958) pp. 321-334:

"How the Korean War Changed U.S. Foreign Policy." U.S. News. 78 (30 June 1975) pp. 61-62.

Jonas, Manfred. "Pro-Axis Sentiment and American Isolationism." Historian. XXIX (Feb. 1967) pp. 221-237.

Lambert, Richard D., ed. "Student Protest." The Annals. 395 (May 1971) pp. 1-25.

Laquer, Walter. "From Globalism to Isolationism." The Atlantic Community Quarterly. (Sept. 1972) pp, 427-436.

Lawrence, David. "New Complacency." U.S. News. 58 (Jan. 1966) p. 124.

"Lindbergh, Charles A." Current Biography. II (July 1941) pp. 42-46.

Lippman, Walter. "One Step Thinking." Newsweek. XXXIV (5 Dec. 1949) pp. 23-25.

Lubell, Samuel. "Is America Going Isolationist Again?" Saturday Evening Post. CCXXIV, Part IV (7 June 1952) p. 19ff.

. "Who Votes Isolationist and Why?" Harpers. CCII (Apr. 1951) pp. 29-36.

Moynihan, Daniel P. "Was Woodrow Wilson Right? Morality and American Foreign Policy." Commentary, 57 (May 1974) pp. 25-31.

Mowrer, Edgar A. "If Not Containment What?" Saturday Review. 36 (18 Apr. 1953) p. 16,

Neuman, Stephanie G. "Fairwell Address to Isolationism." Intellect. 105 (July 1976) p. 17.

"New Isolationism." Time. 85 (8 Jan, 1965) p. 14.

"New Turn Toward Isolationism." Christian Century, 74 (22 May 1957) p. 644.

Perkins, Dexter. "Fundamental Principles of American Foreign Policy." The Annals. 218 (Nov. 1941) pp. 9-19.

Reeves, Jesse S. "The Interrelation of the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the Nation." The Annals. 218 (Nov. l' 41) pp. 1-8.

113

Schlesinger, Arthur H. "The New Isolationism." Atlantic. CLXXXIX (May 1952) pp. 34-38.

Smuckler, John. "The Region of Isolationism." American Political Science Review. XLIV (June 1953) pp. 386-401.

Weinberg, Albert K. "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolationism." American Political Science Review. XXXIV (June 1940) pp. 539-547.

Wheeler, Burton K. "The American People Want No War." Vital Speeches of the Day. VII (June 1941) pp. 489-491.

"Why Commit Suicide?" Common Sense. VII (Mar. 1938) pp. 3-5.

Government Documents

U.S. Congress, Senate. Annuls. 18th Congress, 1823. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

. Congress, Senate. Congressional Record. 66th Congress, 1919.

. Congress, House. Congressional Record. 69th Congress, 1927.

. Congress, Senate. Congressional Record. 72nd-77th Con­gress, 1932-1941.

. Congress, House. Congressional Record. 72nd-77th Congress, 1932-1941.

Congress, House. Congressional Record. 80th Congress, 1947.

. Congress, Senate. Congressional Record. 81st Congress, 1950.

. Department of State. Press Releases. XVII, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Newspapers

New York Times. 11 Apr. 1935; 18,19 Aug. 1937; 22 Jan. 1938; 5 Apr. 1938; 5,11 Jan. 1939; 9,12,20 July 1939; 21,22,27,29 Sept. 1939; 12 Sept, 1941.